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INTRODUCTION 
Etymologically the word religion comes from Latin and there are two possible 
original definitions to the term; relegere – to pick out again, to harvest, or to read again, 
and religare – to bind back.  Both possible etymologies connote a sense of authority since 
either in the practice of reading or harvesting the person is engaging dictating its own 
terms. There is also a sense of the other embedded in the term religion in the prefix re, 
indicating a sense of movement in the word that implies a returning to something and 
thus necessarily offering some sort of resistance.  Whatever is being sought after has the 
affect of bonding and binding together the disparate elements within the term as well as a 
bearing fruit for some future moment, and when layered with cultured symbols, myths, 
and rituals, the process generates religious societies and traditions which are then 
archived into the term. So the term religion synthesizes complex and disparate processes 
to facilitate the understanding of the meaning making practices and traditions of societies 
and individuals.   
The backgrounding of complexity by the logocentric deduction of such epistemic 
technologies grounds Derrida’s claim, “To think religion is to think Roman.”1  Derrida’s 
statement betrays the very cultural context through which religious/secular discourse 
evolved in the West, namely Christian Europe. The assumptions behind the definitions of 
these terms are themselves culturally situated. The ideas and narratives of the secular 
emerge from a Western, Christian tradition, rather than as from some logical extension of 
replacing faith with reason as the justification for government. The narratives of the 
secular and the religious are further backgrounded by the “privatization” of religion under 
the banner of a secular public space. The “privatization” of religion has facilitated an 
                                                            
1 Derrida 1996, pg. 4 
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uncritical assessment of many of the underlying assumptions operating within our 
“secular” society, since they are generated through a Christian discourse and history.   
A specific, Western understanding of "religion" leads to the idea of an a priori 
separation between such spaces as a private religious space and a public secular space, 
housing the binary division within a Western construct.  The globalization of this 
understanding of "religion" under the guise of secularism is actually a source of 
conceptual (and even actual) violence toward religious others, which would be those 
without such a split, because not all meaning-making practices are divided into such neat 
spaces.  The study of religion will help us to think critically about the secular/religious 
split and to ameliorate this conceptual violence by bringing to light the underlying 
complexity of logocentric technologies at work in the western construct of “religion”.  
My thesis challenges the notion that there can be a secular space which is free from the 
influence of religion, as well as a religion which is free of the secular.  Further, such 
simple separations of religious and secular leaves important biases uncriticized.  These 
biases are carried over and operate behind the consciousness of a nation’s citizens.  The 
issue is exacerbated in a globalizing world, where the western distinction is imposed 
upon other spaces. It is for this reason that some form of religious studies ought to be 
taught in the public school system.  A good place to analyze such assumptions is the 
public school, where students learn critical thinking skills to challenge uncriticized 
assumptions.  The inability to ask critical questions about religion helps underwrite the 
religious illiteracy of the country.    
To make this argument, my thesis starts by pointing to the fact that such spaces as 
religious or secular spaces are discursively formed rather than empirically given.  The 
3 
 
fact that both spaces are formulated against one another complicates simplistic attempts 
to define the secular, such as the secular being the public square, completely detached 
from a private religious space and therefore uninterested and immune from religious 
affairs. The significance of the discursive process which formulates secular and religious 
spaces, relative to their local environment, lies not only in the fact that these spaces 
function differently and have different characteristics in different times and in different 
places, or that the secular is more than simply the non-religious aspect of a society, but 
that both spaces are arbitrarily negotiated within their specific cultural context against 
one another.  The arbitration process betrays the fact that both “secular” and “religious” 
discourses share common interests and goals, make claims on the bodies and symbols 
which inhabit these spaces and identify with them, and follow similar patterns to achieve 
these ends because the understanding of what both the “secular” and “religious” typically 
mean in such discourses have been constructed co-dependently. Talal Asad, for instance, 
comments on the similar objectives and interests among these competing discourses by 
localizing the discussion within modern Egypt between secularist and Islamist politicians, 
who are negotiating the boundaries surrounding and delineating secular and religious 
spaces within their local context. He writes, 
Both of them agree that the rural and urban lower classes are immersed 
in ‘non-Islamic beliefs and practices,’ in a deep-rooted culture that owes 
more to Pharaonic and Coptic Egypt…Both agree also that these classes 
need to be educated out of their superstition, an obstacle to their 
becoming ‘truly modern.’…Of course the two tendencies are by no 
means the same; they do not draw on the same sensibilities.  Each 
attaches to itself elements of what is generally represented in political 
discourse as ‘the secular’ but not entirely the same elements.2  
                                                            
2 Asad 2003, pg. 253 - 254 
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The implications of these processes are not limited to Egypt.   To tout Western 
secular society, as many multinational institutions do for example, as “objective and 
rationally based” and therefore the model of secularity to be followed across the world, 
backgrounds the history and politics which negotiated the construction of the American 
secular space vis-a-vis its religious counterpart.  Moreover, to ignore the discursive 
processes at work behind the formations of these spaces necessarily occludes the pretext 
that generated the discourse in the first place.  The occlusions absorb these pretexts as 
uncriticized assumptions within these spaces and then are spread institutionally across the 
world through the power incorporated by institutions’ who present themselves as secular, 
rational, and objective, but operate on assumptions drawn from a certain history.  Leaving 
this process uncriticized and expropriating it through government and non-government 
backed institutions then is to artificially impose the terms of these negotiated spaces upon 
other cultures when interacting with them; it is, thus, to impose the American social 
contract upon other societies.  To emphasize the delicacy of the formation of these spaces 
and foster greater awareness to the processes behind them, Asad comments, “A secular 
state is not one characterized by religious indifference, or rational ethics - or political 
toleration.  It is a complex arrangement of legal reasoning, moral practice, and political 
authority.  This arrangement is not the simple outcome of the struggle of secular reason 
against the despotism of religious authority.”3   
The issue of having a critically engaged social body will be dealt with throughout 
the thesis and will draw on the various works of Michel Foucault. His discursive 
methodology and critical analysis theories neither essentializes these concepts nor 
                                                            
3 Ibid, pg. 255 
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empties them of substance.  Instead, Foucault illustrates the processes behind the 
formation of concepts with his theory of “systems of formations,” which emphasizes a 
level of sensitivity to the locality and temporality of the conditions of the formation of a 
concept.  These conditions are generating not only the “legitimate” authorities behind the 
construction of a concept, but also the interactive environment which is integral to these 
concepts. “What are described as ‘systems of formations’ do not constitute the terminal 
stage of discourse, if by that one means the texts (or words) as they appear, with their 
vocabulary, syntax, logical structure, or rhetorical organization. Analysis remains anterior 
to this manifest level, which is that of the completed construction…in short, it leaves the 
final placing of the text in dotted outline.”4  When Foucault states that “analysis remains 
anterior” to the manifestation of an object, he is emphasizing that the formation of any 
object of discussion is preceded by an analysis of the constituent parts to the object.  In 
other words, before I can point my finger at someone and say that she is practicing 
religion, I need to have an archive drawn that defines that activity as religious, and the 
audience to whom I am referring must share it as well for it to be sensible as intended by 
me.  However, these archives are locally and environmentally situated, and when the 
bodies carrying the archives leave the bounds of their environment, the implementation 
of that archive in a different setting may generate a violent response from certain aspects 
of the environment.  Additionally, Foucault’s theoretical approach leaves concepts and 
their phenomenal representations, such as institutions, open ended for the reformation of 
these concepts from multiple perspectives.  Such an approach opens up the possibilities 
not only to reinterpret our own assumptions about the future and the trajectories that are 
leading them there, but also for liberating an interpretation of the past against the 
                                                            
4 Foucault 1972, pg. 75 
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differing context of the present.  Maintaining a cleavage between the “religious” and 
“not-religious” entails a passive right to the use of violence, which demands an ability to 
responsibility enforce it, while the violence engendered by a misrepresentation of religion 
is a consequence of religious illiteracy and both serve as good reasons why a religious 
literate population is important for social cohesion.   
  Secular societies such as the United States are largely ignorant to the complexity 
of the processes that form religious and secular spaces because of the various linguistic 
technologies which obscure that complexity. For various motivations, authorities within 
secular societies have typically resorted to simplistic and problematic definitions of 
secular and religious spaces to clearly demarcate the responsibilities and oversights of the 
two.  A typical definition of “secularity” suggests discourse grounded in reason and a 
disenchanted view of the world.  The construction of such a space is “cleanly” 
demarcated appositionally, in a binary relationship, to a religious discourse grounded in 
belief in “superhuman/supernatural” powers with a voluntary “faith-based” membership 
to its institutions. The self-understanding of the secular as institutionally separate from 
the religion based on a relationship to “superhuman powers,” when left uncriticized, can 
easily justify an understanding of the position of the secular as “above” the religious in 
terms of authority and “objectivity,” since access to it is assumed to be universally 
available rather than through faith-based assent.  Such a conclusion also implicates the 
religious as not being concerned with the day to day worldly affairs everyone shares, but 
rather with the “spiritual” or God, etc.  The other implication for religion in this 
definition, since it derives the authority of its claims from a “metaphysic,” is that it needs 
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to be scrutinized and criticized before it is accepted in a way that acceptance of secular 
assumptions is not.    
A rigid, binary institutional approach to defining the secular and the religious 
backgrounds how and when religion is acting within an institutionally secular space and 
when the secular is acting within a religious space.  The biggest issue with a dogmatic 
institutional approach to conceptualizing religious and secular spaces is that such rigid 
categorization violently suffocates attempts to reform these spaces.  Not only does this 
method radically exclude religious sources of knowledge and backgrounds the 
genealogical process by which we have contracted the porous limits of our own 
negotiated secular and religious epistemology, but implicit also is the assumption that 
secularity is the eventual developmental goal of modernity.  The problem with projecting 
secularity as the eventual telos of modern development becomes more acute when a 
particular brand of secularity, such as American style secularity, is being spread across 
the world through various secular institutional mechanisms such as the World Bank and 
the IMF, operating under the guise of “rational and objective social scientists.”  In this 
process, what gets left behind in the presumptions of our present “modernizing projects” 
is that these institutions carry with them, not only economic models of development, but 
a certain ethic and lifestyle that are structured by the “modern project.” They in turn 
become imposed, through the various institutional mechanisms, upon those in other 
societies just as in previous times the colonization of “new worlds” and Christianizing of 
peoples took place under the guise of progress.    
 But what evidence is there that there is such a thing as ‘a modern 
project’?...Especially over the past fifteen years, the analyses and 
prescriptions by international agencies dominated by the United States 
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(OECD, IMF, the World Bank) have been remarkably similar regardless 
of the country being considered…As Halimi notes, that model is not 
confined to matters of free trade and private enterprise but includes 
moral and political dimensions-prominent among them being the 
doctrine of secularism.5   
What is revealed, if these dimensions are deconstructed even further, is not only 
Western styled secularism uncritically imposed via its representative institutions, but also 
the pretextual assumptions which allow for this particular conceptualization of secularism 
and its contingent institutions to arise, such as the very religion/secular divide and the 
assumptions that feed it.  When these doctrines are contextualized within an epistemic 
framework which understands and defines the religious/secular divide as binarily and 
irreconcilably opposed to each other, and moreover, one that marginalizes religion as 
inherently inconsequential to worldly affairs, this conclusion will generate conflict.  Mark 
Juergensmeyer in Terror in the Mind of God has demonstrated how recent cultures of 
religious violence developed when faced with this “modern project” and the satanizing 
discourse they implement to justify their behavior. One unitive element tying the 
discourses on the conflict between the interests of global financial institutions and the 
lifestyles they structure in other societies is that they receive their justification and 
support through the citizenry of secular Western states. They therefore are encumbered 
with the responsibility of recognizing the consequences of the actions of those who speak 
in their name.   
One assumption perpetuated by the “modern project” derived from Western 
thought, relevant to the formation of religious cultures of violence, is the hyper-
accentuation of the conceptualization of agency as individual and active while veiling 
                                                            
5 Asad 2003, pg. 14 - 15 
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other forms of agency.  The approach to agency being illustrated backgrounds the 
genealogical relationships between the effects of an act upon the environment, especially 
as the event becomes spatially and temporally distant.  This is to say that religious 
cultures of violence are part and parcel to the discourse they are critiquing, because it is 
that discourse which helps to generate the formation of such cultures of violence.  When 
Western media pundits demonize religious cultures of violence as solely responsible for 
religious acts of violence, they absolve themselves and Western society of their 
responsibility for acts of religious violence. Ultimately, such conceptualizations of 
agency reduce the recognition of the value placed on the surrounding environment as a 
formative aspect of relationships, as well as the individual’s and society’s role as an 
environmental factor. The surrounding environment then is seen as purely instrumental.  
The silencing of the environment as formative and value-laden reinforces a buffered 
sense of identity that is carried over into institutional identities, such as a “buffered” 
secular space and a “buffered” religious space.  This repression of variant forms of 
agency is at least in part a symptom of religious illiteracy within the U.S. citizenry, which 
awards agency to the individual, active and proximate agent of an event and is reluctant 
to value passivity as a form agency.  A buffered sense of identity, coupled with radically 
reduced sense of responsibility, justifies the dissemination of the West’s own 
understanding of right action globally and uncritically by its citizenry, because they are 
freed from the guilt that would arise if they were to recognize their connection to a 
religious act of violence.  Mind you, this sense of self-righteousness and innocence is 
then coupled and propelled by the belief that Western ideology equates with rational 
objectivity.  The moral and political dimensions referred to by Asad in the above passage 
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become especially volatile when they are universalized and reinforced with state 
apparatuses, such as the judicial system, the monetary institutions, and military 
institutions of the “modern project.”   
To reconcile the differences that result when opposing worldviews collide, 
judicial systems are charged in modern, secular states with maintaining social cohesion 
and peace through the use of legitimized violence.  But these judicial institutions are 
themselves encoded with certain cultural assumptions since they demand to be the only 
legitimate source of violence within the bounds of a society. This assumption necessitates 
a delegitimization of other forms of violence including religiously legitimized forms of 
violence within societies.  Also, these judicial mechanisms often fail when applied to 
other environments, regardless of their “objectivity.”  One such foundational assumption 
is that citizens of secular states are universally subjected to the judicial process because 
of the value of universal human rights guaranteed by secular states.  The usage of 
universalizing language to justify Western institutions within Western societies becomes 
the basis for justifying the same institutions elsewhere. The stress that arises from the 
arbitrary implementation, through the mechanisms hinted at in the previous paragraph, of 
culturally constructed understandings of the prescribed role of religious/secular spaces 
has a direct connection with the question of who administers the legitimate use of 
violence within a society.  This has become an acute problem with our rapidly narrowing 
world; therefore, the third reason this thesis argues for the inclusion of religious studies in 
a public academic setting is to equip students with a deeper understanding of the 
connection between religion, violence, and their cultural constructions.  When the judicial 
system of a society finds difficulty reconciling itself as the only legitimate authority to 
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dispense violence within a society, as is the case with vibrant cultures of religious 
violence, the use of violence spills out from the judicial parameters, and thus acts of 
terrorism arise.  The study of religion helps to alleviate some of these issues by giving the 
public the tools to criticize and reform the differing elements of their society and how 
they approach other ones as well.  Not only is the study of religion relevant for an 
understanding of the mechanisms of our own judicial system, but it also gives a deeper 
understanding to why religious “fundamentalists” resort to terrorism and equips 
American citizens with tools to better critique government policies constructed around 
the political manipulation of terrorism.  This is not to mention that these students become 
the next generation of soldiers who are charged with the primary responsibility of 
mitigating the danger of religious violence, but they also, most probably, become the first 
experience of an American when they are stationed in countries such as Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  After studying this process, what is enlightening is the fact that the 
religious “fundamentalists” are portrayed as “socially deviant” others, who then bear the 
full brunt of judicial violence and, paradoxically, have to be demonized and stripped of 
their universal humanity. The stripping of these rights is in order to justify the judicial 
violence that social deviants receive against their embodied dignity as human beings, in 
other words, the rights “endowed by their creator” must be compromised.  The internal 
conflict within the social psyche between the construction of the “ideal” person, who can 
fully exercise and is worthy of the grace of human rights, against the justification for 
removing them from the social deviant, can be seen in the following passage from Asad. 
His comment on the dissonance that arises for the justifications that validate the 
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conceptualization of universal human rights is crucial for understanding how the 
judiciary justifies the dispensation of violence towards its social deviants. 
 [Hanna]Arendt might have noted, however, that sacredness in the 
modern secular state is attributed not to real living persons but precisely 
to the ‘the human’ conceptualized abstractly, or imagined in a state of 
nature.  Every real person who belongs to a particular nation-state is 
always subject to its intuitional violence-including the violence of its 
law, and liable to military conscription that can result in his death.  It is 
only the abstract modern citizen who is sacred by virtue of his or her 
abstract participation in popular sovereignty.6   
The enlightening aspect is that in truth then, no person can truly live up to the 
universalized image of a prototypical person, and it puts those who perpetuate these types 
of assumptions into a difficult position, since their own hypocrisy could easily become 
unmasked.  The implications of this hypocrisy are realized both in the state and the 
individual.  Not only are individuals not able to fully live this abstract standard of 
personhood, but these individuals make up the state itself. The inconsistency between the 
promotion of Western secularization and its corresponding notion of “individual” and 
universal human rights as inevitable and indemnified from critique is what creates 
dissonance both within and around this model of secularity. This is true, not only of 
religious “fundamentalists” but also with all socially deviant aspects of society, which in 
various periods of our social history, have had to bear this violence.  With respect to other 
societies, Talal Asad demonstrates that the imposition of the common assumptions of a 
secular state have ruptured the social fabric of Islamic countries when complicated with 
issues of nationalism, religion, identity, authority, and judicial procedure.    
Thus for secularists each citizen is equal to every other, an equal legal 
and political member that itself claims a single personality.  In their 
                                                            
6 Ibid, pg. 143 - 144 
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scheme the categories ‘majority’ and ‘minority’ technically relate to 
electoral politics only, but in practice they reflect entrenched social 
inequalities.  For Islamists they are basic cultural categories that define 
citizens as necessarily unequal.  In the modern state, both make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for people who belong to different religions 
(Muslims, Christians, and Jews) to live in accordance with their 
traditions without – on the one hand – having to be grouped invidiously 
as dhimmis (non-Muslim protected subjects of a Muslim state) or – on 
the other hand – as ‘ethnicities’ (that is, as ‘minorities’ unwilling or 
unable to assimilate to ‘the national culture’).7   
The final chapter of my thesis will focus on how the teaching about religion 
provides access to differing conceptualizations of all of our assumptions, and how they 
function in a given time and place.  Critiquing the pretextual assumptions of a society 
gives students the opportunity, in concert with the other critical tools developed 
throughout the curriculum, to criticize and articulate how they wish to be represented.  
Moreover, the teaching about religion gives students multiple examples of how different 
religious people practice their faith, thereby rupturing stereotyped misrepresentations and 
alleviating the consequences of demonization. This brings me to the last and perhaps 
most important point of the thesis, the teaching about religion within a public school 
setting will help create an attitude of self-criticism that unearths the assumptions of 
society; such unearthing is ever more important in a globalized world if we are to avoid 
conceptual and actual violence based upon background definitions within our most 
closely held assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Ibid, pg. 250 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
As I argued in the introduction, simplistic approaches to defining what is 
“religious” and “secular” helps to promote religious violence. In what follows, I examine 
this violence in terms of what Juergensmeyer describes as a process of  “satanization.” 
This chapter will argue that the underlying linguistic structure of Juergensmeyer’s term 
“satanization” is a form of binary language that seeks to place the blame upon an other 
for all the perceived social ills. Satanization is structurally related to the process by which 
the hard secular/religious divide arises.  In its satanizing form, binary language justifies 
the specific use of religious violence toward others in an effort to alleviate their social 
ills.  Religious violence is justified by dehumanizing the opponent and conferring upon 
the other the role of the absolute category of the “demon” with respect to what 
Juergensmeyer has termed the “cosmic war” scenario.   In the case of the problematic 
secular/religious divide, the United States government and society is typically 
represented as the prime bastion of secular society and its progenitor across the world.  
The association of American society as the exemplary social model leads the United 
States government to be portrayed as the “demon” in these “cosmic war” scenarios.  
“More than any other nation, America has been assigned the role of primary or secondary 
foe.”8 As such, it is criticized not only by radicals outside of the United States, but also 
by radicals within the United States who are critical of it.  The satanizing process is 
present in the Christian anti-abortion activist Michael Bray’s characterization of the 
American government as, “Nazism and advocating a biblically based religious politics to 
                                                            
8 Ibid, pg. 181 
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replace the secular government.”9  Juergensmeyer agrees with the typical depiction of the 
United States as supporting secular values and capitalist structures. “Like all stereotypes, 
each of these characterizations holds a certain amount of truth.  America’s culture and 
economy have dominated societies around the world in ways that have caused concern to 
protectors of local societies.”10  Ultimately, any proposal to address religious violence has 
to consider not only the backgrounding of the role of religious principles in secular 
societies, but also the material conditions, poverty, health care, etc., and the linguistic 
mechanisms such as satanizing and essentializing languages which justify violent 
behavior.  The ignoring of religious language in the secular is precisely part of the reason 
that the secular society of the US can be satanized: in claiming some sort of universal 
reason accessible to all, it is an affront to the truths of religious peoples.   
Returning to the relationship between violence and the maintenance of the secular 
space, we are caught in an almost aporic situation; on the one hand the differentiation of 
secular politics from religious institutions is what enabled secular values to flourish, but 
at the same time has encouraged a violent response from fringe but important religious 
groups, which threatens them.  Here we should be able to see why rigid institution 
approaches to religious and secular spaces engender violence.  One cannot do without the 
other, and when the other is silenced and backgrounded, they retaliate aggressively.  To 
relieve the tension, secular society needs to re-empower religion and religious groups but 
in such a manner that does not jeopardize secular-minded people.  On the other hand, to 
reintegrate religion and religious institutions’ to positions of power within a secular 
                                                            
9 Ibid, pg. 27 
 
10 Ibid, pg. 184 - 185 
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environment, their totalizing and at times mutually exclusive discourses would need to be 
diverted from their claims upon the bodies of religious and non-religious people.  In other 
words, religion and their representatives would need to find a place within the secular 
space where they are neither silenced, nor so loud that they hinder their adherents from 
acting on their own conscience.  The hope is that both parties recognize their mutual 
existential (and historical) co-dependence, and for both to recognize they are making 
differentiating claims on the same bodies, which leads to stress. Juergensmeyer 
comments on how the images of violence within a religious context provide the escape 
and rationale for the underlying sense of hopelessness. He writes, “The irony of these 
bloody images is that the object of faith has always been peace.  But in order to portray a 
state of harmony convincingly, religion has had to emphasize disharmony and its ability 
to contain it.”11  To achieve a balance to the constant portrayal of the United States as the 
“demon,” a counter-discourse to that demonization would need to be perpetuated, thereby 
suggesting a furthering of binary language.  
 
BINARY LANGUAGE 
Binary language, as briefly mentioned above, constructs absolute categories in an 
effort to portray objects as polar opposites by manipulating signs, and generating 
cleavages such as: “religion/secular,” “black/white,” “positive/negative,” “good/evil,” 
“war/peace,” “subject/object,” “pure/impure,” “male/female,” or “us/them.” When signs 
                                                            
11 Ibid, pg. 162 
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are formulated against each other in such a way, the categories within a binary language 
construct functions as a form of what Foucault calls a “statement,” which he defines as: 
 the modality of existence proper to that group of signs: a modality that 
allows it to be something more than a series of traces…something more 
than a mere object made by a human being; a modality that allows it to 
be in relation with a domain of objects to prescribe a definite position to 
any possible subject, to be situated among other verbal performances, 
and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality.12  
In other words, binary language is the structure in which groups of signs are 
articulated against each other in a mutually exclusive way. The presentation of these 
signs as mutually exclusive is problematic because the nature of the relationship between 
the signs in any language construct is fluid, while needing to maintain a relationship to 
each other so the association to their referent can be sensible. The consequence is that the 
actual relationship between the signs can be modified into something else, disrupting the 
clarity of representing that to which the signs refers, but at the same time liberating the 
signs from always representing the same referent.  What makes binary language distinct 
to other forms of statements is the value it applies to the positions of the signs constructed 
by the statement, as well as presenting the signs in such a manner that the categories 
appear fixed in time.   
Oppositional binary language qualifies one aspect of the statement over the other 
by silencing the other of the two and denying their mutual dependence. The silencing of 
the other creates a monological understanding of the signs/value system, which leads to 
the essentialization of the objects signified according to the demands of the first position.  
Val Plumwood has a similar critique of binary language, which she refers to as radical 
                                                            
12 Foucault 1976, pg. 107 
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dualism, which is a binary relationship that refuses to admit their interrelatedness. She 
writes, “Dualistic constructions of reason and nature, mind and body, spirit and flesh 
create polarizing metaphors and understandings of these elements which are woven 
through many kinds of social division in the dominant culture.”13  To essentialize the 
categories presented, there needs to be a mechanism which qualifies and justifies the 
signs against each other. Plumwood summarizes an example of the judicial process of 
valuing one pole of the statement over the other with respect to the binary construct of 
reason/emotion compounded upon the male/female construct.  She writes, “Reason, the 
‘manly’ element in the soul, was opposed to the inferior and corrupting ‘female’ 
elements…Reason in the human was lodged in the higher body and especially the 
head…and in the case of the larger world the seat of reason and value is in a timeless 
abstract higher realm.”14  The gendered representation of the “public” space as 
“masculine” and “rational” against the “private” space as “feminine” places greater value 
to the public/masculine/rational paradigm over the private/feminine/emotional paradigm, 
and reinforces the static binary division of religion/secular.  Religion becomes implicated 
in this process as it is represented as feminine when it is pushed, at least perceptionally, 
to the “private” space. The religion/feminine/private mix becomes especially dangerous 
when men in marginalized cultures of religious violence have understood their religion to 
be emasculated, and take arms to remedy this. Juergensmeyer comments to this as well,  
These fears of impending marginality have undoubtedly helped to fuel 
the racism of many radical religious movements.  Kerry Noble, one of 
the leaders of the Christian Identity…said that he used to preach 
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sermons describing blacks as the “beasts of the field”…blaming Jews for 
most of the problems in the modern world: “for the pornography, for the 
lack of morality, for the economic situation in America, for minority 
rights over white rights, and for kicking God out of the 
schools.”…Noble was expressing his own frustration over the inability 
of white Christian men like himself to control the world around them.15 
With their static representations and “qualified justifications,” the categories 
mentioned above go uncriticized and draw a myth of eternality to them, i.e. they are taken 
as “common sense.”  One such binarily constructed myth revolves around the hyper-
separation of humans from the natural environment, or anthropocentrism.  Leaving the 
myth uncriticized as it is in our society perpetuates a sense of alienation from the 
environment within the consciousness of those under the spell of anthropocentrism. The 
sense of alienation is then reinforced through various technologies such as the 
construction of another myth that places humans at the center of creation, charged with 
the responsibility to steward if not outright dominate the rest of nature.  The ubiquity of 
the developed sense of alienation is also present as a part of the secular, scientific 
narrative, which allows scientists to experiment on dead nature; and allows consumers to 
consume raw materials uncritically from the rest of the natural world. To achieve the 
effect of eternality, what binary language has to background is its modal elements, 
meaning the different dimensions within the statement that can also be rearranged to 
highlight different aspects and other dimensions to their reality, thus revealing different 
qualities, conclusions, and relationships.  To justify the myth of anthropocentrism it has 
to be presented as if it is a revelation from God, or a reflection of some external 
dimension that is the “really real,” if it is to obstruct this modal reality.  The occlusion of 
its modality supports the primary end of binary language constructs, which is to produce 
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some qualified object over another, and present it as knowledge that is justified because 
can be repeatedly verified.  Such knowledge can then be used for manipulating the 
material objects for the purposes of the primary pole by closing off alternate possibilities 
of becoming.  Once again we turn to Plumwood for an explanation of the relationship 
between the knowledge produced and justified by a binary relationship. “As we have 
seen, knowledge, instead of being a collaborative effort between knower and known, in 
part the creation of a nature conceived as rationally knowable, is reconceived as entirely 
the creation of a rational (male) knower who monopolizes agency and reason.”16  
Plumwood also eloquently verbalizes the result of the implementation of binary language 
constructs when she writes,  
A sharp boundary and maximum separation of identity enable the 
beneficiaries of these arrangements to both justify and reassure 
themselves…Typically supremacist classifications reconstruct a highly 
diverse field in which there may be many forms of continuity in terms of 
two polarised and internally homogenized ‘superior’ and ’inferior’ 
racialised or genderised classes.17 
To rupture the static representation of objects enabled by binary language and the 
limited knowledge produced through its framework, I analyze the discursive elements 
which allow their construction.  Such an analysis is important for the religious/secular 
divide because it is the tool through which assumptions such as anthropocentrism, or the 
feminization of the private space and its association with religious spaces, can be sifted, 
and hence deconstructed and analyzed.  First, for the categories in a binary language 
construct to oppose each other there needs to be a discourse which sets one against the 
other, such as the discourse which places religion as the “private” aspect of a society 
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against the “public” secular aspect.  The discourse itself is bound by the context 
surrounding the author of a statement, which localizes and materializes the statement.  
Foucault states, “To describe a statement is not a matter of isolating and 
characterizing a horizontal segment; but of defining the conditions in which the function 
that gave a series of signs…an existence, and a specific existence, can operate.”18 With 
respect to satanizing discourses, religious language and imagery are always drawn from a 
particular religious tradition, and not only a singular religious tradition such as Islam per 
se, but Islam as understood in its violent context. “Discourse in this sense is not an ideal 
timeless form that also possess a history…it is, from beginning to end, historical – a 
fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in history itself, posing the problem of its 
own limits.”19   Second, since discourses have a temporal and historical grounding to 
them, it is the context of a discourse that becomes the generative source of significance 
for the objects in a binary language construct because it is what formulates the 
differences between the categories.  Importantly, the context of one discourse can also be 
part of another discourse, and not all the texts of a discourse are necessarily to be found 
in every other discourse.  The implication of closing off access to the texts of other 
discourses, or how the same text can be understood in a different discourse, is a brushing 
aside of notions of relationality and replacing it with some vague ideological constructs, 
such as a “guiding spirit,” “development,” or “continuity.” Such constructs however 
insidiously unify statements and events within a discourse.  Instead the bond of the binary 
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is not seen as relative and relationality is backgrounded, thus closing off possibilities for 
recreation.   
Relations between statements (even if the author is unaware of them; 
even if the statements do not have the same author; even if the authors 
were unaware of each other’s existence); relations between groups of 
status thus established (even if these groups do not concern the same, or 
even adjacent, fields; even if they do not possess the same formal level; 
even if they are not the locus of assignable exchanges); relations 
between statements and groups of statements…To reveal in all its purity 
the space in which discursive events are deployed…is to leave oneself 
free to describe the relations within it and outside it.20 
 
 Discourses are dependent upon other discourses, each generating their own 
respective, tentative, and sometimes antagonistic historical trajectories.  The 
interdependency of discourses means that within a discursive formation there is always 
an “other” against which other discourses are able to form objects, concepts, and 
strategies, binding discourses together.  The other’s response to a discourse is the fruit of 
the call and response game in which statements are made into an unknown future and 
await a response (an affirmation or a denial).  Whenever a statement is set into a 
discursive formation, the audience can hear in the silence, as they await the response, the 
culminated historical trajectories of a statement within a discursive formation, but this 
takes deconstruction.  The tenuous relationship between the formation of objects, our 
groping for their verification, and the stability they provide is succinctly stated by 
Derrida, in terms of the arkheion., “The arkheion of which we are the guests, in which we 
speak, from which we speak.  To which we speak, I might also say: addressing it.”21 It is 
the initial experience of the arkheion, the moment of the unitive bond between an object 
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and the meaning ascribed to it by the witness that everyday speech attempts to reproduce 
when communicating.  To speak in the arkheion is effectively to mean what one says 
about whatever one is saying, while at the same time and in that very process, addressing 
whatever has already been said about the elements represented.  Speaking plainly about 
something, or witnessing and sharing to an arkheion initiates two functions that enable 
the two poles of a binary relationship, a sequential function and a jussive function.  “We 
have there [the arkheion] two orders of order: sequential and jussive.  From this point on, 
a series of cleavages will incessantly divide every atom of our lexicon.”22  The jussive 
function of the arkheion gives the relationship its voice so to speak, its characteristics 
against which representations of that relationship are then judged. The jussive function 
gives speech its plainness.  The importance of the jussive function is that it sets the initial 
boundary that forms the way relationships are then represented, and makes these 
representations matter because they are documented and stored in the memory, not only 
of those represented but in those witnessing to the representation.  Moreover, that first 
impression leaves the witness with an image that becomes a burden to overcome for the 
object being represented should there arise a need or desire to do so.  These 
representations are carried in the consciousness of those involved in witnessing the 
representation, initiating the sequential function of the arkheion, which, alongside the 
jussive function of other arkheions, the elements that give rise to the arkheion are 
repeatedly judged, thus bifurcating each element.  Representations then are never neutral; 
they always carry with them some subsequent implication and are necessarily presented 
as true for them to be credible and useful, which also implies a struggle to overcome a 
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misrepresentation.  The accumulation of these representations and misrepresentations is 
catalogued in an archive. 
There is a second component to Derrida’s conceptualization of the arkheion 
which is critical for this thesis, and that is that the arkheion is also a place.  “There, we 
said, and in this place. How are we to think of there? And this taking place or this having 
a place of the arkhe?”  There are two aspects to the place of an arkheion, the “taking 
place” and the “having a place.”  My thesis understands that the “taking place” of an 
arkheion, the bonding of a certain representation of the other to me, to be spontaneous 
bonds that can occur any moment or at any time, through casual conversation, eaves 
dropping off-handed remarks, uncriticized presumptions, images in motion, etc.  The 
“having a place” refers to sites which are looked upon by society to construct such bonds, 
such as the public school, a body, landscapes, written words, etc.  These two aspects are 
not mutually exclusive and both rely on each other.  For the “taking place” to flourish, it 
seeks the protection of the “having a place.” And the end of “having a place,” is for 
construction to “take place.” The public school as a “having a place” for building bonds 
will be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter, as this chapter will continue to 
focus with the “taking place” aspect of archiving.  So, for the moment it is sufficient to 
note both aspects of place with the arkheion and move on to the implications for binary 
constructs. 
   Alongside the bond between signs in a statement there is an empty space that 
allows for the dispersion and redistribution of statements. This allows for differing 
discursive formations to develop.  Foucault explains that, “the ‘signifying’ structure of 
language (langage) always refers back to something else…Language always seems to be 
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inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distance; it is hollowed by absence.”23  Binary 
language is one formation that erupts from this space on account of its drive to 
essentialize its categories. Binary language fills the void between the poles of a statement 
with an unbridgeable distance rather than a discursive void.  Such a void allows for the 
cleavage of sequential time, disrupting misrepresentations and their sequential and 
jussive trajectories, and the closing up of this space is a further affront to relationality. 
The suppression of the empty space is critical for the binary language construct Val 
Plumwood labels “hegemonic centrism,” which she describes as, “a primary-secondary 
pattern of attribution that sets up one term ‘the One’ as primary or as centre and defines 
marginal Others as secondary or derivative in relation to it, for example, as deficient in 
relations to the centre.”24  It is the re-opening of the empty space that teaching about 
religion can achieve: not only in regards to religious/secular distinctions, but to other 
discourses couched in binary terms.  Examining these empty spaces reveals the 
relationality between others and the violence caused by ignoring this relationality. 
The consequence of leaving the void between binaries, between “others,” unfilled 
and discursive would mean leaving the void open to spontaneity and uncertainty. It is 
precisely this uncertainty that the filling of a void with a binary construct seeks to avoid.  
To reopen the space would entail a revaluation of the quality accorded to both positions 
in a binary construct.  There is a very real effect to the secondary or peripheral pole in a 
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hegemonic centric structure: it produces a sense of humiliation and invalidation for the 
distanced and silenced other. The question becomes how to redirect the discourses 
feeding religious justifications for violence without further alienating the humiliated and 
downtrodden by invalidating their experiences, and without emptying the critical nature 
of religious spaces.  To open up potential discourses, a more profound view of language 
and its relationship to religion will need to be investigated.  The study of religion could 
be used as a forum for people to give voice to their dissatisfaction or grievances with 
secular society without resorting to violence, as well as, providing an opportunity for 
secular leaning students/witnesses to articulate their concerns on religious matters.   
DERRIDA AND MESSIANISM 
Such analysis of language must take note of what Derrida calls the messianic 
drive of language. Since religion seeks to discourse with that which is beyond human 
technologies such as archives, there can never be a complete validation to the waiting for 
the justification of religion’s claim, i.e. objective validation of the ultimate referred to in 
religious practice, only a mystical validation or the true eschaton could do so if at all. To 
momentarily settle the issue of religion within this process a turn to Derrida’s term of 
domiciliation serves as a good parallel: 
The meaning of ‘archive,’…comes to it [Latin] from the Greek 
arkheion, initially a house…the residence of the superior magistrates, 
the archons, those who commanded…On account of their publicly 
recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place…that official 
documents are filed.  The archons are first of all the documents’’ 
guardians….They are also accorded the hermeneutical right and 
competence…to interpret the archives.  Entrusted to such archons, these 
documents in effect speak the law: they recall the law and call on or 
impose the law.  To be guarded thus, in the jurisdiction of this speaking 
the law, they needed at once a guardian and a localization.  Even in their 
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guardianship or their hermeneutic tradition, the archives could do neither 
without substrate nor without residence.  It is thus, in this domiciliation, 
in this house arrest, that archives take place.25   
 
So, the archive is a site of authority and the platform from which a witness 
testifies and enables the witness to begin to testify. “The archive stands, then, as the 
address that grounds all address, the place that makes way for place, the site that 
commands and commences.  It is the address from which an individual responds, just as 
it is that which makes response possible, that to which everything is always 
responding.”26 For an archive to retain the authority it emits, it needs a place which 
intersects with its power to allow the domiciliation process to occur, the symbiotic 
relationship between the “taking place” and “having a place” of the archive.  “They all 
have to do with this topo-nomology, with this archontic dimension of domiciliation, with 
this archic, in truth patriarchic, function, without which no archive would ever come into 
play…To shelter itself and, sheltered, to conceal itself.”27 Each archive has its own 
archival starting point, which Derrida has termed the arkhe, which in a religious archive 
would be a revelation of the ultimate.  The arkhe is what enables each testimony and to 
which each testimony refers back to justify.  Robert elaborates on the original arkhe 
moment, “The arkhe marks the originary cleavage; it separates inside and outside, leading 
to a series of cleavages that mark here and there, now and then, thereby making possible 
all such conditions of difference.”28  The cleaving function of the arkhe allows signs to be 
identified, classified, and gathered into the archive, which Derrida terms as the archontic 
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principle.  The process of the gathering together of the like signs into the archive Derrida 
terms consignation under the archontic principle. “Consignation aims to coordinate a 
single corpus, in a system or a synchrony in which all the elements articulate the unity of 
an ideal configuration.”29  
The testimony takes place in an instant and it is not for the now per se, instead its 
authority will lie in the future when the moment itself lies in the past.  When a present is 
coming from the future, it seeks to control its unpredictability with the authority of that 
past, as it were a ‘resurrection of the dead’ from the archive occurs.  Now, the archive 
stands as a storehouse of the cleavages which hold testimonies to individual identities.  
The archive stores private memories turned to objects of history, which is enabled by the 
actions of the witness’ testimony, demarcating the archive as a unique place which blurs 
rigid categories. “Hence the archive is the place where private (inside) and public 
(outside) meet.”30 These memories are imbued with language and language is prime 
technology of the archive which gives direction to the future in the present with 
references to the past through the accumulation of witnesses.  The testimonial of each 
witness labels, identifies, anoints, a person, place, and presence for public scrutiny.  
These testimonials form the first discourses that enable other discourses.  The positive 
anointing by the witness Derrida labels as messianicity without messianism, whose 
spontaneous arrival creates an anxiety: “be prepared (waiting without awaiting itself) for 
the best as for the worse, the one never coming without opening the possibility of the 
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other.”31  The source of the anxiety lies in the uncertainty of the chora as it slides from 
future to present, surrounding the witness and archive, and it is this anxiety to control that 
also propels the witness to testify. “To bear witness, then, always bears witness to 
death…Delivering a eulogy – testifying to the life of the other who has in some sense 
drowned – is the work of mourning issuing forth from the ‘here I am’ at the root of all 
testimony.”32 Robert Gibbs reiterates the futurist preoccupation of the archive propelled 
by a fear of death, which underlies its messianic attribute. He writes, “The archive as a 
preserve of past events exists for the sake of the future, and indeed, for an opening of the 
future.  Historical research is not about the past but about the future.”33  Through the 
housing of discourses, testimonials, statements, etc. in archives, it creates a messianic 
component which seeks to justify its actions in the present through a representation in a 
future that will never materialize as articulated because any articulation can never fully 
describe the future.  What lies in the future that is known is death, hence the anxiety over 
unpredictability.  This anxiety is exacerbated by the multiplicity of archives, each 
projecting its own messianism and anxieties over death. 
This underlying anxiety is what drives William Robert’s understanding of the act 
of witnessing: “Echoing Abraham’s response to God’s call in Genesis 22:1, the witness 
responds to a call, and in doing so, she identifies a place, a person, and a presence...This 
framework gets at the heart of the act of bearing witness-and it is an act, an action that 
she performs, for to respond, she must act.”34 Moreover, the speaker is necessarily 
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identified with the testimonial given. “Hence any speech act takes place because the 
speaking individual identifies herself with and in the very event of saying.”35 Thus to 
bear witness is encumbered with an implied responsibility.  
Not only does the witness who offers testimony promise to speak to the 
other (for testimony is always addressed to an other) but she also 
promises to speak truthfully…Bear witness, then, is a response.  It 
stands as an individual’s response to the call of responsibility and to the 
promises carried by that call.36  
Thou shalt not lie, to lie is to break the underlying faith between audience and the 
witness, for a testimony is always presented as truthful.  Paradoxically, the testimonial 
can never fully articulate whatever is being witnessed to and in a way is always a lie.  
The incessant anxiety of validating the faith in a witness, in verifying the testimony as 
fact, is reminiscent of what Derrida terms as “messianicity without messianism.” “This 
would be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice 
but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic prefiguration.”37  By 
preconceived expectation and prophetic prefiguration, Derrida speaks of a particular 
religious understanding of messianism, as opposed to messianism as a phenomenon of 
language itself.  “This justice inscribes itself in advance in the promise, in the act of faith 
or in the appeal to faith that inhabits every act of language and every address to the 
other.”38   The responsibility of the witness to the audience of her testimony, as well as 
the fact that this responsibility can never be fully carried out, is affected by the reality of 
death, which is religion’s promise, and to which each religion testifies.  
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In conclusion, binary representations erupt from an environment through the 
experiences of those defining the terms of a binary relationship.  The bond that relates to 
the elements to one another and defines them has to be attested and witnessed to by 
others, initiating a movement, in order for the bond to have a material dimension, thus 
forming the testimony.  Through the act of witnessing and testimony, archives are formed 
which house the testimonies as they move through time and the archives themselves are 
labeled, forming a new bond and generating the archive’s messianic dimension.  The 
messianic dimension of the archive illustrates the problem of the name.  Underneath the 
name lies shifting and fluctuating movements which dislocate the bonds of the name to 
their intended archives.  In the crisis of dislocation, the messianic dimension of the 
archive also holds a promise, since these layers were materially generated, that the 
dislocated bond can be repaired, however unlikely the possibility for such an event to 
occur.  The problem is present whenever speaking about the secular as apart or separate 
from the religious, and is exacerbated when “foreign” formulations of the same elements 
are introduced into the environment.  In other words, the promise of the American secular 
society is a promise to its American religious societies, which have been predominantly 
Christian.  Some groups of Muslims, Jews, and even other Christian groups feel they 
have not negotiated their positions within the same archival network, or as some of their 
numbers grow, would like to renegotiate the terms.  The issue of violence arises when the 
secular then presents itself as open to a religious denominations but betrays preferences 
for certain religious practices, undermining its own principles.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will explore the issues involved with relying solely on simplified 
definitions of religious and secular spaces, such as a model based on a binary 
differentiation between the institutions’ functions. The chapter will begin with a critical 
analysis of a theory of religion posited by Martin Riesebrodt, who uses such a 
problematic methodology derived from institutional differentiation.  One issue of 
Riesebrodt’s approach is that it backgrounds the interdependent relationship between the 
formulations of both religious and secular spaces and does not recognize a space that can 
potentially rupture such static representations should the need arise. In other words, 
Riesebrodt does not offer a space in his analysis that is not clearly religious or secular in 
order to delineate the secular from the religious, or to question spaces when they are 
presented as secular or religious. Setting out to define religion or the religious as 
Riesebrodt does, he falls directly into the binary trap articulated in chapter 1. By focusing 
on the problematic use of a clear typological model based on a hard institutional 
demarcation between religious and secular institutions, this chapter will also argue that a 
discursive approach to the study of religion, which Riesebrodt absolutely abhors, is still a 
better approach than Riesebrodt’s typology. Discursive approaches highlight and explain 
the dynamism behind the archives of religious traditions and their secular counterparts (as 
discussed in the previous chapter).  Moreover, discursive and deconstructive 
methodologies unpack the generative mechanisms by which the differing constituent 
parts of a religious tradition form and disperse according to differing environmental 
conditions in order to form our present, localized, epistemological framework, and what 
33 
 
the secular therefore means.  A discursive method allows for clear and precise 
understanding, not of a definite identity of the spaces themselves, but of the relationships 
between the formations of a “religious space” and a “secular space,” without having to 
devise a scheme to explain the uniformity of religious practice universally. At any rate, 
such essentializing language eventually contradicts itself.  While discursive 
methodologies avoid this contradictory pitfall by avoiding essentialized categories, this 
does not mean that they necessarily fall into the trap of reducing all phenomena as 
“religious,” or that all meaning is radically subjective, or that analysts are left without the 
analytic tools necessary for comparative practices, as Riesebrodt argues.  In fact, 
Riesebrodt’s methodology is no less a victim of the contradictory process behind the 
essentializing and mutually exclusive language he uses.  This chapter will elaborate on 
the contradictions present in his methodology by drawing on the internal incoherence of 
two of the more foundational aspects of his theory, which has implications for the 
importance of the study of religion.  These two aspects are interrelated and form the 
basis, not only of his theory, but of the very process that this thesis argues against when 
attempting to compare religions and religious phenomena.  The first foundational aspect 
of Riesebrodt’s methodology which will be critiqued is his understanding that religions 
are dependent on “superhuman” powers.  The second foundational aspect leading to 
inconsistency is his interpretation that religions are dependent on a centralized institution 
which regulates, mediates, and rationalizes the discursive relationship between the 
“superhuman” powers and their religious believers.  The final section of this chapter will 
follow Jacques Derrida’s work in “Faith and Knowledge: The Sources of Religion at the 
Limits of Reason Alone” to criticize and unearth the problems with Riesebrodt’s 
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typology and how such a typology masks the negotiative process and genealogical 
relationship between religious and secular spaces within Western secular societies.  The 
reason for emphasizing the discursive nature of institutions is, again, that public spaces 
are defined by them. The public school is one such institution understood as a 
cornerstone of the public, secular square (despite education historically being associated 
with religious institutions), and is thus a wonderful example for discussion.  Not only 
that, the public school’s place within the secular square makes it instrumental in the 
formation of the categories under scrutiny and complicit in allowing simplistic definitions 
of religious and secular to run free.  It is my opinion that currently, the public school does 
not adequately equip its students with the sufficient level of education for them to 
intelligently negotiate the formation of spaces, and that some of the blame lies in relying 
on simplistic definitions of what is “religious” and “secular”.   
 
THE RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR IN RIESEBRODT’S METHOD 
Martin Riesebrodt in The Promise of Salvation has posited a theory of religion as 
a response to what he perceives as the paltry state of present research on religion: “it was 
chiefly the unsatisfactory state of research on religion that led me to propose a theory of 
religion.”39  He has a particular dislike for discourse theory and deconstructionism, which 
this thesis uses as its method.  Riesebrodt states   
I oppose my theory of religion to deconstructionism, which…hinders 
serious research…Such a position cannot be maintained in the long run, 
for in deconstructing a given concept one has to make use of other 
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concepts…This obviously holds for all concepts that might be 
substituted for the concept of religion.40 
 Riesebrodt sees the overemphasis on language and linguistics in postmodern 
analysis as the principle weakness in their methodology, which to him is to focus on an 
elitist practice.  “They tend to focus on the discourses of political and intellectual elites, 
while ignoring the deviating practices of large population groups.”41  However, to ignore 
the linguistic justifications and rationales for behavior is to background an important 
aspect for understanding their genealogical history, current justification, and future 
trajectory.   The full significance of denying or ignoring the linguistic justifications for 
behavior will be explored in the next chapter with respect to religious justifications for 
violence.  For now, the issue with Riesebrodt’s typology and his disregard for taking into 
account the linguistic justifications for religious and secular identity is that it does not 
allow for the study of new and emergent traditions, such as Deep Ecology or the 
“cafeteria spirituality” phenomenon, which do not rely on a central institution to define 
their identity; thus, his theory backgrounds their participation and effect on both the 
religious and secular landscapes. 
Riesebrodt’s theory centers on the interaction between religious institutions and 
the “superhuman” powers, which direct the practices of the religious masses through 
religious institutions.42   These two conditions are what enable Riesebrodt to make the 
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following claim from his definition of religion: “The definition also avoids the absurd, 
overly broad understandings of religion according to which soccer games, shopping at a 
supermarket, or barbecues are religious phenomena.”43  The ultimate purpose of a 
definition of religion for Riesebrodt, as well as what governs his arbitration between 
“religious” and “secular” statements, is a desire for the construction of an analytical 
concept to differentiate “religious” behavior from “non-religious” behavior. “General 
concepts are indispensible for any cognitive ordering of the world…We need a 
conceptual framework that allows us to make comparisons and thus to precisely describe 
and qualify similarities and differences.”44  However, such rigid categorization inevitably 
renders the various practices, justifications, and formations of “institutionalized” 
religions incoherent when faithfully applied universally.  One such practice which could 
easily be misconstrued when viewed from the perspective of a Western observer is the 
Chinese practice of ancestor “worship.”  Unless elaborated by the practitioner’s own 
understanding of the practice, this practice becomes difficult to pigeonhole precisely as a 
religious practice, and thus as a religious space, according to Riesebrodt’s method. While 
these practices are and have been regulated by Confucian, Daoist, and Chinese Buddhist 
institutions, China’s communist government has also appropriated the practice and 
promotes the custom despite its self-understanding as a secular and irreligious state. So 
who is the legitimate institutional authority to deem the practice of ancestor “worship” as 
“religious” or “secular?”  Moreover, the silencing of the interdependent relationship 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
practices, which aim at establishing contact with superhuman powers, I call interventionist practices.” 
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between the two spaces backgrounds how the constitutive elements of each space may 
fall between either of the two categories depending upon the environment.  What this 
means is, if the Chinese secular government silences the religious genealogy behind the 
practice, to one merely observing it, the practice would appear as a secular ritual.  A 
discursive approach would take the phenomenon and demonstrate how it has been 
understood differently in different contexts, without the necessity of having to make a 
judgment one way or the other.  Foucault illustrates the process behind what he terms 
“systems of formations,” which is relevant to the formation of concepts such as the 
secular and religious. “What are described as ‘systems of formations’ do not constitute 
the terminal stage of discourse, if by that one means the texts (or words) as they appear, 
with their vocabulary, syntax, logical structure, or rhetorical organization. Analysis 
remains anterior to this manifest level, which is that of the completed construction…in 
short, it leaves the final placing of the text in dotted outline.”45  An important implication 
that discursive approaches bring to light is that, whatever conclusion is drawn, whatever 
object is described, and what task is assigned, it must always be drawn and set in a 
context first.  Nothing is simply empirical. Before going further into a critique of 
Riesebrodt’s rigid methodology, it is important to understand and respond to his 
underlying objection to discourse theory. He writes, 
 If one accepts the premises of discourse theory, then all concepts are 
gradually dissolved into ultimately incomparable particularisms.  In my 
view, we cannot adequately describe the uniqueness of social 
phenomena without general concepts and comparisons.  Moreover, in 
contrast to this historically relativist view, it turns out that types of 
discourse are quite similar over and beyond periods and cultures.46   
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With respect to methodological issues, Riesebrodt’s principal objection to 
discursive approaches is that they leave the analyst without conceptual tools, since there 
is no outside “check-list” to facilitate the analysis.  However, his objection is 
ungrounded, discourse theory does not consider the “ultimate” precariously contingent 
dimensions of an object incomparable since they are in constant flux; on the contrary, it is 
the very fact that these dimensions are in flux, that they dismember themselves and 
rearrange themselves, leaving traces of themselves in this migratory activity, which 
enables us to compare and analyze phenomena.  When these dimensions and 
particularities are in constant flux they do so according to discursive rules being regulated 
and authorized by various agents and impersonal processes embedded within the 
epistemic framework they operate.  However, different epistemic frameworks exist across 
time and space, leading to different formulations of different objects, which may or may 
not resemble their functioning and understanding in other frameworks.  Foucault 
emphasizes the spontaneity in the formation of discursive practices,  
Thus it is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of 
old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of paradigm, 
modification of systematic ensembles).  It is a question of what governs 
statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to 
constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and 
hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures.47   
Talal Asad takes this challenge from Foucault and applies these parameters to the 
study of religion, concluding not that one cannot study “religion” as Riesebrodt 
understands, but that one must always temporalize and historicize the particular tradition 
one is studying:  
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From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and 
utterances are to be sought in social phenomena, but only that their 
possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products 
of historically distinctive disciplines and forces.  The anthropological 
student of particular religions should therefore begin from this point, in 
a sense unpacking the comprehensive concept which he or she translates 
as ‘religion’ into heterogeneous elements according to its historical 
character.48 
Since the public school system has been invested as an authority on the 
epistemological construction of these categories and governs the authoritative statements 
in its production of knowledge, as are embodied by its students, it plays a role in how 
these concepts are formulated both imaginatively and phenomenologically.  I am not 
trying to stay that religions and religious people do not have a voice in what religion 
means, or that the public school is the only secular author of its understanding of religion, 
but that the public school is invested with properly inscribing into the students what the 
world is and how to engage it, which has ramifications on the construction of 
religious/secular spaces, and how we engage in other formulations of such spaces.  The 
point is that the public school holds a special position, since everyone is mandated by the 
government to an education, both to the perception and expectation of the quality of 
knowledge produced and the entailment to constantly reassess its epistemological 
reproduction. Also, whenever misrepresentations of other religious traditions occur 
within the dominant society, whether through problematic definitions constructed “to 
simplify their lives,” or for political motivations to demonize the other, the public school 
should be charged with the obligation to deconstruct such misrepresentations by 
providing students with a sufficient level of religious literacy to do so.  Relying on 
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people’s “common sense” to approaching the concept of what a religion is and what the 
secular is, is not an adequate or viable approach to such influential and important spaces. 
Riesebrodt’s emphasis on the institutional character for defining religion directly 
feeds into the second bone he has to pick with postmodern theoreticians concerning their 
uneasiness with establishing such rigidly defined categories.  He focuses his second 
objection on Talal Asad’s claim that there is no universal definition for the term religion.  
The following passage is drawn directly from Asad’s own work and unabashedly 
articulates the sentiment Riesebrodt finds so troubling. 
What we call religious power was differently distributed and had a 
different thrust…Nevertheless, what the anthropologist is confronted 
with, as a consequence, is not merely a collection of elements and 
processes that we happen to call ‘religion.’ For the entire phenomenon is 
to be seen in large measure in the context of Christian attempts to 
achieve a coherence in doctrines and practices, rules and regulations, 
even if that was a state never fully attained.  My argument is that there 
cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its 
constituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but 
because that definition is itself the historical product of discursive 
processes.49   
In Riesebrodt’s view this argument is illogical, there has to be some essence that 
is being discussed in order to make sense of the world. He writes,  
Asad’s claim that there could be no universal concept of religion is 
neither sufficiently grounded nor logically valid…even if one adheres to 
the view that religion has a different structure, function, and meaning in 
different social formations, this view requires a concept of religion on 
which such a claim can be grounded.50   
However it would be wise to consult Foucault and his wariness towards claiming 
such extemporal positivities. Such descriptions remove the environmental context from 
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which concepts are generated.  To stubbornly insist on external positivities which 
ultimately backfires when the object referred to or the person embodying the knowledge 
migrates to a different environment, and misrepresents the new localized context of 
whatever is conceptualized.  This does not bode well for Riesebrodt’s insistence on a 
universal essence to any concept precisely because he is pretending to give the conditions 
for the emergence of religion regardless of the environmental conditions that affect such 
an emergence. 
Descriptions that are directed not toward knowledge as an instance of 
formation but to the objects, forms of enunciation, concepts, and finally, 
to the opinions which they give rise; descriptions that will, nevertheless, 
only remain legitimate on the condition that they do not pretend to 
discover the conditions of something as a scientific discourse.51   
The troublesome issue with science and scientific discourse is the broad 
assumption in our modern society to take its conclusions uncritically as an extemporal, 
ahistorical “Truth” or as something essential, similar to what Riesebrodt is attempting to 
construct by defining the term “religion.” Part of the problem is that one can never prove 
the underlying foundations of a system of thought from within the system.  Thus, positing 
a foundation ignores the very context out of which the system develops and in which it 
functions.  The backgrounding of the context from which systems of forms objects, even 
through the scientific method, leads to problematic ideological assumptions. Foucault 
illustrates this problem elsewhere when such pretensions are left uncriticized, “One of the 
great problems that arose was that of the political status of science and the ideological 
functions it could serve.”52  It is this precise sentiment that encumbers Asad from making 
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a claim to a universal definition for religion, undermining the rationale for Riesebrodt’s 
whole project. 
 Yet the insistence that religion has an autonomous essence - not to be 
confused with the essence of science, or of politics, or of common sense-
invites us to define religion (like any essence) as a transhistorical and 
transcultural phenomenon.  It may be a happy accident that this effort of 
defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be 
kept quite separate from politics, law, and science-spaces in which 
varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctly modern life.  This 
definition is at once part of a strategy (for secular liberals) of the 
confinement, and (for liberal Christians) of the defense of religion.53   
 
Then for Riesebrodt to make a valid claim for a universalized concept of the term 
“religion” to be applied within the framework of social scientific comparative analysis, 
the concept would principally need a method that arrives at a definition which is 
historically specific yet fluid enough that it does not betray any ulterior motive, privilege, 
or prejudice to any particular cultural construction as the universal conditions for defining 
“religion;” nor can the definition be so constrained as to choke any emergent religious 
movement from the conceptualization of the term.  Also for Riesebrodt, the crux of a 
religion should be self-sufficient, i.e. a religion should not have to depend upon another 
religion to define itself institutionally outside of the preliminary historical development 
of the religion.  To be fair, this does not mean for Riesebrodt that there is no room for 
syncretism or that every religion develops each of its dimensions sui generis, but that, for 
example, Buddhism is clearly institutionally demarcated and independent from the 
institutions of Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, Daoism, Christianity, etc.  He believes he 
achieves this aim by following Max Weber’s ideal types,  
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The continuing relevance of Max Weber’s sociology consists not least in 
the fact that he was fully  aware of this problem…His elaboration of 
types constantly distinguishes between general types of action and 
culturally specific forms.  Furthermore, Weber’s ideal types are 
deliberately constructed to serve not as classification schemes but as 
instruments for the precise description of historically specific 
formations.54   
For Riesebrodt, establishing contact with “superhuman” powers is not enough to 
term this discursive relationship “religion.”  Individual religious practice and religious 
behavior does not alone constitute a religion for Riesebrodt. “Regulations regarding 
behavior are, however, valid as religious practices only when they occur in accord with 
the will, the principles, or the sanctions of superhuman powers.”55 Riesebrodt qualifies 
“religious” actions and practices from “religion” proper with religion being “the complex 
of religious practice.”56  Riesebrodt articulates the difference by suggesting that  
Someone who practices Zen meditation on Mondays, turns tables on 
Tuesdays, lays out Tarot cars on Thursdays, and goes to Mass on 
Sundays is performing religious acts, but the systematic connection 
among them is lacking. If this connection is produced only subjectively, 
then these practices lack the social character of a religion.57   
Each example of a practice presented by Riesebrodt in the previous quote--Zen 
meditation, turning tables, Tarot cards, and Mass--has some connection to a religion and 
religious practices.  What upsets Riesebrodt is that someone would observe such a 
practice and dub it a religion. He has described this process as what some have termed as 
the modern phenomenon of “cafeteria spirituality.”  If Riesebrodt is not concerned with 
an articulate and theologically pure system of practice, and understands practice itself as 
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the crux of religion, with that practice regulated and confirmed by a group of people 
according to the “will, principles, and sanctions of superhuman powers,” then how does 
the example of the “cafeteria spirituality” of the religious person mentioned above not 
equal a practice of religion? And this is relevant for the scientific studies of religion 
because, as Riesebrodt grudgingly notes, such forms of “religious practice” are increasing 
in numbers of practitioners, 
 Even if there is an unmistakable trend toward religious voluntarism and 
subjectivism, especially among younger members of the middle class in 
Western countries… ‘Spirituality’ may prove in the long run to be 
transitional phenomena.  We certainly cannot exclude the possibility that 
future generations will turn to more stable religious institutions.58   
While he does have a point about the future of established religious traditions, 
how is his hostility towards the current “loose” religious practices of the West justified or 
any different from a Theravadin lay person going to a Brahman priest for help with 
something, or a Japanese Shinto priest going to a Zen retreat for a few weeks or months 
to escape from the city?  Riesebrodt himself has to admit to the lax institutional 
parameters of the East:   
An important difference between the Abrahamic religions and East 
Asian religions lies in the formers’ claim to exclusivity.  Whereas 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam expect their adherents to respect the 
boundaries between the traditions, East Asian religions, with the 
exception of Nichiren Buddhism, make no such claim.  No Japanese is 
forced to choose between Shinto and Buddhism; no Chinese must 
choose between Daoist, Buddhist, or ‘popular religious’ practices.  On 
the contrary: for the most part, even Chinese Japanese rulers cultivated a 
variety of religious traditions at their courts, and sometimes practices 
these various forms privately.59 
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Riesebrodt has no answer for the question, from an institutionally differentiated 
point of view, how are the general religious practices of the East any different from the 
situation with the phenomenon of “cafeteria spirituality” in modern Western countries, 
the practitioners of which also have an array of religious practices from differing 
institutions from which to choose?  Since there are such heavy and exclusive conditions 
within Riesebrodt’s typology, ultimately his theory should be considered untenable: from 
within his own criteria for what constitutes a good theory.  Moreover, when applied 
universally, this typology misrepresents, not only religious others in different cultural 
contexts, but also the differing and changing religious practices and climate of our own 
society by misrepresenting and excluding citizens within secular societies who are 
outside of such rigid categorization, such as Deep Ecologists.  In this way, discursive 
approaches provide a better methodology for the study of religion than this typological 
method which confuses the functioning of religion in different societies and does not 
allow the religious practitioner’s themselves to articulate their own understanding of their 
religion, however nonsensical or annoying this maybe to Riesebrodt.  The most serious 
issue however is that Riesebrodt’s typology does not give the requisite space for new 
religious traditions to emerge, since by definition they would fall outside of Riesebrodt’s 
typology because their institutions are not yet developed.  Also, by using discursive 
methods, different trends within religions can be highlighted to show commonalities and 
differences without turning every phenomenon into a religion.  
Discursive methodologies, by emphasizing the locality, temporality, and 
trajectory of the constituent parts of a concept or phenomenon, unearth the fact that these 
dimensions and particularities are in constant flux and are able to come together and 
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break away.  The teaching about religions enhances education by providing not only a 
critical lens to critique with, but also a whole archive for students to intellectually mine.  
Also, when these particularities and dimensions come together and break away, it 
happens for a reason and according to discursive rules, which are negotiating the outline 
of these concepts and spaces between the differing and complex actors within the 
environment.  Foucault emphasizes the spontaneity embedded in such formations of 
discursive practices,  
Thus it is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of 
old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of paradigm, 
modification of systematic ensembles).  It is a question of what governs 
statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to 
constitute a set of propositions which are scientifically acceptable, and 
hence capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures.60   
Talal Asad takes this concept from Foucault and applies it to the study of religion, 
concluding not that one cannot study “religion” as Riesebrodt’s theory understands, but 
that one must always temporalize and historicize the particular tradition one is studying:  
From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious practices and 
utterances are to be sought in social phenomena, but only that their 
possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products 
of historically distinctive disciplines and forces.  The anthropological 
student of particular religions should therefore begin from this point, in 
a sense unpacking the comprehensive concept which he or she translates 
as ‘religion’ into heterogeneous elements according to its historical 
character.61 
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RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR FROM A DISCURSIVE PERSPECTIVE 
As was explored in the previous section of the chapter, Riesebrodt, by centralizing 
his theory of religion as belief in “superhuman powers” to overcome the difficulties of 
life, is creating what Kant termed as “the religion of cult alone.” As Jacques Derrida 
argues and I agree that, “the religion of the cult alone seeks ‘favours of God,’ but at 
bottom, and in essence, it does not act, teaching only prayer and desire.  Man is not 
obliged to be better.”62  This is not to say that according to Riesebrodt religions do not act 
in society, but that religious people only act religiously when they act in concert with 
their religious institutions, either as the practice of religion, or as religiously sanctioned 
critique of secular society, such as religious cultures of violence. People would also act 
religiously in this framework when their actions are directed towards their own religious 
institutions for religious reasons.  The point that I am attempting to make is that 
Riesebrodt’s understanding of religion falls into this category, and this is problematic for 
the study of religion because, as we have seen, not all religious activity acts in line or is 
directed against an institution.   
Interestingly, the “religion of cult alone” is completely different from the other 
form of religion that Kant described, “moral religion” or “reflecting faith.” Derrida also 
comments on this religious type in the following passage, which is irrespective to any 
“superhuman” power and not dependent on any religious institution.  His commentary on 
“moral religion” is insightful in illustrating Riesebrodt’s uneasiness with fitting religions 
of this type within his framework: “Moral religion, by contrast, is interested in the good 
conduct of life; it enjoins him to action, it subordinates knowledge to it and dissociates it 
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from itself, prescribing that man become better by acting to this end.”63  In other words, 
Derrida’s take on Kant’s category of “moral religion” is a religion which derives 
authority not on “superhuman” powers per se, but on the very human ability to observe 
the phenomenal world and empirically draw conclusions from it.  Not only do “moral 
religions” proclaim these empirically based conclusions as “true” and “objective,” they 
also authorize a certain ethic based on the conclusions drawn from this rational process 
and have it defined as “the good.” If that was not enough, this “good” is presented as 
somehow unaffected by this very process, conducted every step of the way by finite 
people.  Finally, “moral religions” universally subscribe everyone to its precepts at a 
theoretical level, because they understand everyone to have access to “the good” through 
their rational faculties, each on his or her own, regardless of the cultural and 
environmental context. 
Derrida’s commentary on Kant’s “moral religion” is insightful in problematizing 
Riesebrodt’s conceptualization of religion because the typical idea behind Western 
approaches to science would easily fall into such a category.  The scientific method is 
used to alleviate problems by drawing empirical conclusions from researching the 
surrounding environment and providing some knowledge that is to be used in relationship 
to that environment in solving the research problem.  Riesebrodt stated that the usefulness 
of his concept is that it clearly allows the researcher to demarcate between religion and 
non-religion, namely secular institutional spaces, which are not devoted to developing 
“superhuman” powers but devoted to maintaining a social order determined by human 
capabilities.  “By the concept of secularization, therefore, I refer solely to the process of 
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institutional differentiation through which secular spaces –that is, social spheres free of 
religious premises and norms-emerge.”64  Here we are in a difficult position. If we were 
to take Derrida’s working of Kant’s theory and apply it to Riesebrodt’s typology, it 
problematizes not only Western science, but all Western “secular” institutions, such as 
the public school.  To maintain the distinctions of “religious” space and “secular” space, 
discourse is inherent for the recognition of another space, an undetermined or blurred 
space, to enable a process of differentiation between the first two.  Riesebrodt, by placing 
a solid wall between religion and the secular, has closed off the discourse, necessarily 
blurry and complex, which would differentiate between the two.  In effect, Riesebrodt’s 
presentation of the secular appears no different from Kant’s “moral religion,” 
undermining the usefulness of his method.  Conversely, Derrida explains why he begins 
his discussion on religion with Kant’s “moral religion,” which he also refers to as 
“reflecting faith,” and its dependency on “dogmatic faith” and its parallel in “religion of 
the cult alone,” to maintain its uniqueness.  
Because it does not depend essentially upon any historical revelation and 
thus agrees with the rationality of purely practical reason, reflecting faith 
favours good will beyond all knowledge.  It is thus opposed to ‘dogmatic 
faith’.  If it breaks with this ‘dogmatic faith’, it is in so far as the latter 
claims to know and thereby ignores the difference between faith and 
knowledge.  Now the principle of such an opposition – and this is why I 
emphasize it – could not be simply definitional, taxonomic or 
theoretical; it serves not simply to classify heterogeneous religions under 
the same name; it could also define, even for us today, a place of 
conflict, if not of war, in the Kantian sense.  Even today, albeit 
provisionally, it could help us structure a problematic.65     
The insight provided by Derrida’s analysis is that “moral religions,” by assuming 
that they are always acting for the good of humanity become no less dogmatic in its 
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methods, and no less ideological in justifying its ends, than a “religion of the cult alone.”  
When both are present in a society, to alleviate the tension generated by the antagonism 
between the two to define the good, society necessitates a viable discourse to enable a 
differentiation between the spaces of the two poles.   The implication of this to my thesis 
is, even when these characteristics are represented in a given space and termed “religion” 
and “secular” rather than “religion of the cult alone” or “moral religion,” if one side 
completely closes itself off from the other, the distinction between the two becomes 
blurred.  Hence one of the reasons why it is so important to have a religiously literate 
citizenry is for the citizens of such a society to thoughtfully and carefully negotiate 
between such boundaries.   
When the state of the relationship deteriorates to such a degree that the 
distinctions are not only blurred, but discourse has been silenced, the climate becomes 
one of war, or at least the environment ripens for violence outside the purview of 
authorized institutions. This occurs because the differences within the society are 
backgrounded to promote the interests of those who are silencing the deviant voices; 
these deviants are then redefined and reincorporated into the social body but 
misrepresented.  So, if religions are solely understood as being concerned with other-
worldly affairs, as “religions of the cult alone,” then any movement by a religious 
institution to act in the world would need to comply with the arbitrary conditions of 
“secular reason” to be taken seriously.  Consider, for instance, the Danish cartoon 
contained a depiction of the prophet Muhammed as a suicide bomber.  There is no 
“secular” reason to not depict the prophet Muhammed, only a devotional reason. 
However, when the Danish government protects the newspaper’s rights to free speech 
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over Muslims who were offended by the representation, on account of the irrationality of 
their request as per the secular viewpoint, they are being no less ideological because the 
conception of free speech as the freedom to say absolutely whatever one wants is no less 
a myth.  Moreover, there is a direct genealogical relationship between the Western 
construction of universal human rights and Protestant Christian theology that is present in 
their justifications.  And Muslims pick up on this all over the world and respond by 
saying that Western secular societies have no deference towards other religions; 
particularly violent or disenfranchised Muslims may respond with violence to this 
perceived humiliation.  Of course this movement to violence backgrounds voices within 
Islamic communities themselves against responding with violence.  Derrida illustrates 
how Islamic terrorists silence moderate Muslims when performing acts of violence by 
speaking in its name and the epistemological quandary that ensues, “Islam is not 
Islamism and we should never forget it, but the latter operates in the name of the former, 
and thus emerges the grave question of the name.”66  As Islamic terrorism speaks for 
Islam as a whole, so does the “modern project” speak for the West, and the world really, 
universally.  The fact that our secular society is grounded in particular religious 
assumptions generates the conditions for people in the West to have to make a choice, or 
to use Derrida’s terminology, a response, to accept the particular Protestant Christian 
assumptions of the “modern project” or to criticize them, but there is no escape from 
addressing them. “They would then constitute a response to everything that our idea of 
democracy, for example, with all its associated juridical, ethical and political concepts, 
including those of the sovereign state, of the citizen-subject, of public and private space 
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etc., still entails that is religious, inherited in truth from a determinate religious 
stratum.”67  To say that one is not able to escape from making a response is not to say that 
one is not free, but the response itself is an aspect of the shared environment.  
There we might have, perhaps, a pre-definition: whatever little may be 
know of religion in the singular, we do know that it is always a response 
and a responsibility prescribed, not chosen freely in an act of pure and 
abstractly autonomous will.  There is no doubt that it implies freedom, 
will and responsibility, but…will and freedom without autonomy.68 
 Derrida sees religion as the response to one’s situation, “Religion, in the 
singular?  Response: ‘Religion is the response.’  Is it not there, perhaps, that we must 
seek the beginning of a response.”69  This initial approach to the concept of religion is 
highly controversial.  First, as Derrida notes, it bears the question, to whom or what is 
one responding? And second, there is a problem with attempting to seek an origin to the 
question, or in other words, solving the first problem engenders another problem. 
Foucault warns us of searching for origins. 
Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin…First, because 
it is an attempt to capture an exact essence of things, their purest 
possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search 
assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world 
of accident and succession.70   
The problem in following Derrida’s approach is that one might end up back to 
Riesebrodt’s position of religion as belief in “superhuman” powers.  However, this is 
only because of the pervasive assumptions attached to religion as a concept already.   So 
let us entertain this approach by Derrida in investigating his string of thought while 
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noting that Derrida does situate himself temporally and historically when speaking about 
the topic. 
We represent and speak four different languages, but our common 
‘culture,’ let’s be frank is more manifestly Christian, barely even 
Judaeo-Christian.  No Muslim is among us, alas…No representative of 
other cults either.  Not a single woman!  We ought to take this into 
account: speaking on behalf of these mute witnesses without speaking 
for them, in place of them, and drawing from this all sorts of 
consequences.71 
When Derrida frames the question of what is religion around religion as a 
response, the “whom” or “what” to which one is responding is always an other, some 
exteriority which initiates a call and assumes an ability to respond by the called. The 
necessity of some exteriority is why “moral” religions have to objectify their conclusions 
and dissociate these objectifications from themselves.  “No response, indeed, without a 
principle of responsibility: one must respond to the other, before the other and to one’s 
self.  And no responsibility without a given word, a sworn pledge, without a pledge, 
without an oath, without some sacrament or ius iurandum.”72  The previous quote’s 
emphasis on the call and response nature of religion is an obvious reference to the 
response by Abraham to God’s call, and it is problematic when carrying this 
understanding of religion over to other religions.  This should not concern us however 
problematic it may appear at the moment because what is being investigated is the 
relationship between religion as it is understood within Western society and the space 
that is created in its “absence.”  So, on the one hand, if God is immediately posited as the 
other who is waiting for a response, as one would tend to do within a typical Western 
context, then one has created a mechanical type of God.  Derrida comments,  
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Presupposed at the origin of all address, coming from the other to whom 
it is also addressed, the wager of a sworn promise, taking immediately 
God as its witness, cannot not but have already, if one can put it this 
way, engendered God quasi-mechanically. A priori ineluctable, a 
descent of God ex machine would stage a transcendental addressing 
machine.  One would thus have begun by posing, retrospectively, the 
absolute right of anteriority, the absolute ‘birthright’ of a One who is not 
born.73  
Also, if one immediately places God as the one questioning, then it completely 
kills the need for a separate space between the person witnessing to God and God Itself.  
“But with God, a God that is present, the existence of a third that is absolute, all 
attestation becomes superfluous, insignificant or secondary.”74  Derrida picks up on the 
idea of testimony and its presence in our society.  It is well known that in the past, court 
rooms would ask witnesses to swear on the Bible and to God that they promised to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.  This practice continues to this day, 
but in a “secularized” format.  “For in taking God as witness, even when he is not named 
in the most ‘secular’ pledge of commitment, the oath cannot not produce, invoke or 
convoke him as already there, and therefore as unengendered and unengenderable, prior 
to being itself: unproducible.  And absent in place.”75   On the other hand, even if God is 
not invoked or respected, as in Western “secular” spaces, there is a sense of emptiness on 
that side which rushes to fill that void.  The “death” of God within modern society has 
created an anxiety with relation to that void.  “Everything begins with the presence of 
that absence.  The ‘deaths of God’, before Christianity, in it and beyond it, are only 
figures and episode.  The unengendered thus re-engendered is the empty place.  Without 
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God no absolute witness.  No absolute witness to be taken as witness in testifying.”76  In 
such a situation then, to relieve the tension and anxiety caused by the removal of God 
from what is being attested to, human reason then fills the role of God to judge and 
rectify human behavior.  Within the Western Christian heritage, the removal of God as 
the locus of truth has been coupled with a virulent and angry rejection of the concept, 
hence never really absent in its totality.  
In the irrepressible invoking of a witness, God would remain then one 
name of the witness, he would be called as witness, thus named, even if 
sometimes the named of this name remains unpronounceable, 
indeterminable, in short: unnameable in his very name; and even if he 
ought to remain absent, non-existent, and above all…unproducible.  
God: the witness as ‘nameable-unnameable’, present-absent witness of 
every oath or of every possible pledge.77   
God remains as a ghost so to speak.  This brings the paradox in Western society, 
even if one wants to do away with “religion” as belief in “superhuman” powers, one in 
the West cannot completely rid oneself of God’s presence because of the ubiquitous 
legacy of Christianity within our society and the superabundance of conclusions drawn 
from that legacy which linger in so called “secular” spaces.  Even if one where to let go 
of the concept of “God,” people just replace God with themselves as the final arbiter of 
their decisions, but not in a totally liberated sense. Richard Fenn holds the view of 
secularization being critiqued and describes the secularization process as: 
The same drive toward freeing the individual from background 
institutions has produced an egalitarian impulse that levels a number of 
moral and aesthetic distinctions that used to accompany social 
class…Individuals now must stand on their own ground…True 
secularity also accepts a psychological divorce, as it were, between the 
individual and larger society.  The terms of the divorce stipulate that the 
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individual will not be able to take narcissistic satisfaction from 
collective illusions about the importance of the larger society; one 
implication of this settlement is that the larger society will have more 
difficulty in placing sacrificial demands on the 
individual…Secularization takes the mystery out of time.78  
However, the removal of the “mystery of time,” i.e. religion, does not rid one of 
choosing one from the other.  What Fenn does not realize is, despite the removal of 
religious institutions from secular spaces, there is still a constant choice being made 
between the two.  If society continues with the terms of divorce, the “removal” of the 
“narcissistic” influence of religion, as Fenn glorifies in his view of secularization, 
violence erupts from the other.  Moreover, secular institutions are no less mysterious in 
their relations to time when they implement terminology such as “modernity,” “invisible 
hand,” and “development” to bind the larger society together and explain its functioning. 
This is why Derrida continues to mention responsibility and how everyone is implicated 
in negotiating the terms between secular and religious. 
As for the response, it is either or.  Either it addresses the absolute other 
as such, with an address that is understood, heard, respected faithfully 
and responsibly; or it retorts, retaliates, compensates and indemnifies 
itself in the war of resentment and of reactivity.  One of the two 
responses ought always to be able to contaminate the other.79  
What Derrida is saying in the previous passage is that both spaces are tied 
together, even if it is to define themselves against each other.  Moreover, those testifying 
should recognize this symbiotic relationship and the possibility of redefinition.  The 
implication of realizing the probability of having to redefine oneself in light of another 
set of circumstances is brought forth in the next passage by Derrida, who implicates the 
conclusions drawn from the Enlightenment period.   
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Light (phos), wherever this arche commands or begins discourse and 
takes the initiative in general…as much in the discourse of philosophy as 
in the discourses of a revelation or of a revealability, of a possibility 
more originary than manifestation.  More originary, which is to say, 
closer to the source, to the sole and same source.  Everywhere light 
dictates that which even yesterday was naively construed to be pure of 
all religion or even opposed to it and whose future must today be 
rethought (Auflarung, Lumieres, Enlightenment, Illuminismo).80  
The real crux of the problem is that one is not certain which of the two responses 
is “correct:” “It will never be proven whether it is the one or the other, never in an act of 
determining, theoretical or cognitive judgement.  This might be the place and the 
responsibility of what is called belief, trustworthiness or fidelity, the fiduciary, ‘trust’ in 
general, the tribunal of faith.”81  But how to have the adherents of either ideology 
recognize the underlying faith behind their epistemic frameworks, and the mutual 
dependency of either category to the other. 
The importance of Derrida’s insight is that it brings to light the underlying 
religious processes behind otherwise seemingly benign words in our secular vocabulary, 
and it enlightens us to the very Christian undertones prevailing in our “secular” society, 
which are spread globally through globalization, or the “modern project” as referenced 
above.  Derrida uses his own term for the globalization process, globalatinization, which 
has the same understanding as the “modern project”:  “We shall return to this later – 
globalatinization (this strange alliance of Christianity, as the experience of the death of 
God, and tele-technoscientific capitalism) is at the same time hegemonic and finite, ultra-
powerful and in the process of exhausting itself.”82  Moreover, the problem with the 
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backgrounded Christian doctrines which are embedded in the form of capitalism 
eschewed from this particular matrix, is not only that they are backgrounded and 
uncriticized, but they make a universal claim, but a claim that on account of its cultural 
and environmental grounding, can never fully realize its ambition.  The universalizing 
ambition is exacerbated when there are attempts, such as Riesebrodt’s theory, to 
dissociate from religion all of its constituent dimensions to retain a core that is somehow 
free from politics, and vice versa.  
One would have to dissociate the essential traits of the religious as such 
from those that establish, for example, the concepts of ethics, of the 
juridical, of the political or of the economic.  And yet, nothing is more 
problematic than such a dissociation.  The fundamental concepts that 
often permit us to isolate or to pretend to isolate the political – 
restricting ourselves to this particular circumscription – remain 
religious.83   
The method by which American “secular” society retains its religious character is 
through the uncritical absorption of its religious descent.  In other words, as the previous 
paragraph mentioned, even with the rejection of the concept of God, the function of the 
concept still leaves an anxiety with respect to the void created by God’s “death” to the 
justification of the other dimensions of our secular society, which is filled with a robust 
humanism.  The problem is that any position is ultimately taken up by faith rather than 
reason or knowledge, regardless if the one who is an atheist realizes it or not.  Derrida 
comments on the pervasiveness of religion throughout our culture by focusing on 
language and on how language changes over time to mask the etymology of our 
vocabulary so much so that it obscures us from the liquidity of these concepts, creating 
problems when applied to others. 
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From here on, the word ‘religion’ is calmly (and violently) applied to 
things which have always been and remain foreign to what this word 
names and arrests in its history.  The same remark could apply to many 
other words, for the entire ‘religious vocabulary’ beginning with ‘cult’, 
‘faith’, ‘belief’, ‘sacred’, ‘holy’, ‘saved’, 
‘unscathed’…Globalatinization (essentially Christian, to be sure), this 
word names a unique event to which a meta-language seems incapable 
of acceding although such a language remains, all the same, of the 
greatest necessity here…What is involved here is a Latinization…rather 
than globality.84 
The anxiety caused by a lack of faith spurs a temptation to knowledge and to 
make claims to knowledge.  It is the anxiety to know that spurs simplistic attempts at 
defining religious and secular spaces.  All of these important implications become 
backgrounded in simplistic approaches such as Riesebrodt’s, which I understand to be the 
general assumption of our society.  It should be the role of the public school from within 
the secular landscape to curb the temptation to rush to simplistic definitions and 
understandings by criticizing prevailing assumptions. 
Knowing is temptation, albeit in a somewhat more singular sense than 
believed when referring habitually to the Evil Genius or to some original 
sin.  The temptation of knowing, the temptation of knowledge, is to 
believe not only that one knows what one knows (which wouldn’t be too 
serious), but also that one knows what knowledge is, that is, free, 
structurally, of belief or of faith – of the fiduciary or of 
trustworthiness.85   
The previous statement by Derrida accuses any epistemology as relying on faith, 
and is a highly problematic statement because consequentially it accuses all Western 
institutions as being inherently religious.  The study of religion should provide citizens 
with the analytical mechanisms to renegotiate and redefine the nature of their religious 
inheritance. 
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Because it is not certain that in addition to or in face of the most 
spectacular and most barbarous crimes of certain ‘fundamentalisms’…, 
other over-armed forces are not also leading ‘wars of religion’, albeit 
unavowed.  Wars or military ‘interventions’, led by the Judaeo-Christian 
West in the name of the best causes (of international law, democracy, 
the sovereignty of peoples, of nations or of states, even of humanitarian 
imperatives), are they not also, from a certain side, wars of religion?86   
The next and final chapter will now continue analyzing the violence created by a 
rigid and unreflective secular/religious divide, and suggest at least five ways in which the 
academic study of religion ameliorates such violence. 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter explored the important relationship between the messianic 
aspects of language, which is language’s implicit need to verify itself as accurately as 
possible in representing what it is referring to.  I also explored the process by which the 
peripheral pole is formed, leads to understanding the humiliating experience of those on 
the periphery of a hegemonic centric discourse.  The messianic element within language 
structures the platform from which individuals view and make sense of the world. That is, 
as people try to verify whatever it is they are talking about, the “whats” and the “whys,” 
and the answers and newly articulated questions that arises from those answers, the very 
process of verification affects their worldview as well as their understanding of their 
environment. Their justifications are constructed along the binary mode illustrated in the 
previous chapter.  Also explored in the previous chapter was the fact that justifications 
for binary language constructs operate in both our secular American culture as well as in 
the cultures that produce the religious terrorists.  The chapter ended with considering 
                                                            
86 Ibid, pg. 25 
61 
 
American society as the center of the hegemonic discourse, and offering an example of 
the type of binary language constructs used to formulate a hegemonic centric discourse.  
The best way to rupture the association of America as this “evil center” is by criticizing 
the assumptions acted upon by Americans, which perpetuate and validate the humiliation 
of those on the periphery.  I argue that some form of religious studies is best suited to 
provide the place and structure for such a critical analysis.  
Michel Foucault has argued that “Education may well be, as of right, the 
instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our own, have access to any kind 
of discourse.”87  The exclusion of the teaching about religion within the American public 
school system, and I am not referring to the optional elective in the select high schools 
that offer them, but the extensive teaching about religion as its own discipline, keeps the 
discussion about religion backgrounded from the discourse in other disciplines, since 
students and teachers lack the adequate skills to tease them out appropriately. Also, the 
backgrounding of the study of religion maintains the uncritical assumption of the doctrine 
of separation between religion as concerned with the metaphysical, and the secular as 
concerned with the affairs of this world. As if religion does not have something to say 
about each and every academic discipline, or as if the secular never resorts to ideology to 
define itself.  Foucault comments on the temporality and discursiveness of such doctrines 
of separation, which should leave one wary of leaving them uncriticized. 
But conversely, doctrine involves the utterances of speakers in the sense 
that doctrine is, permanently, the sign, the manifestation and the 
instrument of a prior adherence…to a struggle, a revolt, resistance, or 
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acceptance.  Doctrine links individuals to certain types of utterances 
while consequently barring them from all others.88   
As the doctrine of separation between religion and the secular has a particular 
history and rationale here in the United States, when immigrants come from other 
cultures, especially non-European ones, or American soldiers are sent to other cultures, 
the particular rationale for the doctrine of separation, with its particular struggles, revolts, 
resistances, etc., do not effect and therefore do not reflect the reality of other notions of 
religion and the secular.  To not respect other understandings of the secular and religious 
is problematic when considering the process of globalization, especially in its hegemonic 
centric form as discussed by Plumwood that silences the voices of opposition to 
globalization. According to Diane Moore, the public school system ought to fulfill the 
mission ascribed to it by Foucault and allow reflection on religious discourse within the 
public school system. Leaving aside the question of how to teach this in a public school, I 
do argue along with Moore that religious studies education is crucial to the healthy 
functioning of an informed citizenry.   Criticizing social values would give citizens a 
greater sense of ownership of the values which are attributed to America, and enable 
them to better articulate rebuttals for those practices which certain Americans may not 
wish to support.  The teaching about religion is also instrumental in transgressing the 
“bourgeois hegemony” bell hooks sees in the values pervading society. “Feminist and 
critical pedagogy are two alternative paradigms for teaching which have really 
emphasized the issue of coming to voice.”89  Critique of social values is integral to my 
thesis about education, which will be discussed below. 
                                                            
88 Ibid, pg. 226 
89 Hooks, pg. 181 
63 
 
One assumption derived from religion to be analyzed below is that of 
anthropocentrism, or “human-centeredness.” It is near ubiquitous among the world’s 
religions and is rampant within our consumer capitalist society.  Anthropocentrism in its 
most hegemonic form denies agency, intrinsic value, and voice to the environment, and 
this will be analyzed in detail below.  All hegemonic centric discourses, are a form of 
anthropocentrism in the sense that the periphery is always denied agency, intrinsic value, 
and voice.  The critique of anthropocentrism—operating from the process of defining 
human / non-human in a binary fashion as mentioned above—could then be extrapolated 
to critique other forms of hegemonic discourses.  Bryan Norton describes the Western 
intellectual history of anthropocentrism and its biblical origin well.  He writes:  
At one important juncture in this intellectual history – when the Judeo-
Christian Creation story was written down – scriptures accorded humans 
‘dominion’ over nature, but with the obligation of stewardship…Clearly, 
within the Western perspective, emphasis has often fallen on the 
‘dominion’ and power aspect of the charge from Genesis.90   
 
Anthropocentrism will be shown to be neither a universal given nor a prudent 
concept.  By defining the environment against human needs, anthropocentrism obstructs 
love, awe, and respect for the environment on the environment’s own terms, even when 
human and environmental interests converge.  “So even if anthropocentrism doesn't 
change what we think it makes sense to do in the world, it might well change how we 
think it makes sense to feel about the world.”91  Such anthropocentrism is, I argue, 
smuggled into the “secular” from religious origins and only supports the need for 
religious studies as part of a balanced education. 
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This chapter will argue that religious studies is important in a “secular” society 
for at least five reasons: 1) to equip citizens with the skills necessary to consciously 
deliberate  and criticize the values and ideals they are reproducing, 2) to develop a varied 
understanding of agency and respect for its consequences, 3) to establish a common place 
for social critique, 4) to prepare citizens for a functional role in the economy of society, 
and 5) and to provide citizens with the tools necessary to articulate and practice their own 
sense of a fulfilling life.  The exclusion of teaching about religion from public life 
handicaps people because it ignores an extremely influential and important dimension of 
the human experience and its effects on society throughout time and space.  Religious 
literacy would fulfill the above aims through the following four effects: 1) by providing 
another analytical lens with which to critique society, 2) by providing the necessary tools 
for a comprehensive understanding of the dynamic actors structuring society, 3) by 
giving alternative models of agency, and 4) in a globalizing world, religious literacy is 
necessary for the social cohesion necessary to enable a fulfilling life.  Moreover, religious 
illiteracy has three negative effects which will be explored below, it: 1) constructs a 
worldview which implies that religion, a whole family of worldviews, is, at best, not 
essential, and at worst, “backward or despotic,” 2) leaves religiously based assumptions 
operating uncritically within society in place, and 3) closes opportunities for viewing 
alternative models of organization, encumbering social criticism.  Moreover, the term 
“religion” itself becomes uncritically defined against whatever the normative American 
experience of religion is at the immediate expense of some other definition of religion 
more sensitive to other conceptualizations of the term.   These ideas are drawn from the 
educational philosophies of Diane Moore, John Dewey, bell hooks, and Elizabeth 
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Schussler-Fiorenza, all of whom advocate the importance of the connection between an 
articulate citizenry and an egalitarian democracy.   The teaching about religion is 
instrumental in transgressing the “bourgeois hegemony” bell hooks sees in the values 
pervading society.  
Feminist and critical pedagogy…have really emphasized the issue of 
coming to voice.  That focus emerged as central, precisely because it 
was so evident that race, sex, and class privilege empower some students 
more than others, granting ‘authority’ to some voices more than others.92   
 
RELIGIOUS ILLITERACY 
Religious literacy is important first of all because the discourses of our modern 
secular society are rooted in previous religious discourses.  To fully enabled citizens to 
deliberate intelligently on social issues within our democracy, religious literacy is 
paramount.  Moore discusses this very point.  She writes, “I was very explicit about the 
need for citizens to have better tools to understand the role of religion in society so that 
they can help strengthen public discourse around contentious issues from a more 
informed position.”93  Elizabeth Schussler-Fiorenza has argued for a similar position 
regarding the teaching about religion. She writes, “We need to learn how to produce and 
teach knowledge of the biblical text not simply for knowledge’s sake or for some 
mediating understanding, but rather also for engaging the intersectional analytic of 
kyriarchy and kyriocentrism, for the sake of conscientization and critical knowledge 
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production.”94  The term kyriarchy is derived from a compounding of two Greek words; 
kurios – meaning lord, or ruler, and arkheion, which was discussed at length in the 
previous chapter.  When these two terms are compounded together, as Schussler-Fiorenza 
does, it connotes a sense of an exclusive lordship over access to the archive, both to their 
topographical construction, the “having a place,” and the conditions which govern their 
temporal occurrences.  Access to these archives has historically been controlled by men, 
along with their proper implementation: hence “patriarchy”. Schussler-Fiorenza’s 
understanding of the kyriarchy is congruent with the “modern project” already discussed 
throughout the thesis, so the “modern project” could be understood as kyriarchal. 
Religious literacy is an important skill to promote within a democracy because of the 
politics of differentiation within a democracy that kyriocentrism and kyriarchy play on, 
through binary language, to formulate hierarchies of exploitation.  Kyriocentrism and 
kyriarchy negatively affect the social cohesion of a society because it depends on binary 
language and the backgrounding of the other.  Both Moore and Schussler-Fiorenza 
articulate the relationship between social cohesion, religious literacy, and an egalitarian 
democracy.  Moore emphasizes the need for religious literacy for issues of social 
cohesion and peace. “If we fail to educate today’s children with the skills to participate in 
and advance democratic citizenship that is defined as a political as opposed to an 
economic category, then the democracy that we Americans so cherish will inevitably 
erode into an empty shell of slogans without substance.”95  Not only is social cohesion 
affected by religious illiteracy, but also the structure of democracy can become affected 
when discourse on religion is silenced.  Moore’s three manifestations of religious 
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illiteracy will be interlaced below with pertinent aspects of Schussler-Fiorenza’s work on 
kyriarchy to demonstrate one possible consequence of religious illiteracy, the 
backgrounding of anthropocentrism within Western consciousness, which underscores 
the importance of religious literacy to democracy. 
In Overcoming Religious Illiteracy Diane Moore has articulated three 
manifestations of religious illiteracy that are both worrisome and correctible.  The first 
manifestation is when secularists dismiss religious convictions as unsophisticated and 
irrational.  Moore cites an example from her own teaching experience, “Here it was 
revealed that four of the ten members of the class believed that religion itself represents 
worldviews that they characterized as ‘unsophisticated, irrational, and oppressive.’  They 
classified themselves (in direct contrast) as ‘secular humanists’ (read sophisticated, 
rational, and non-oppressive) and implied that ‘all intelligent’ people share this self-
definition.”96  Jeff Schweitzer wrote an article that has been posted on Richard Dawkins’ 
website which betrays this same bias. 
So, why religion? Human weakness and gullibility. The master of all 
major faiths is the compelling quintet of fear of death, the need to 
explain away the unknowns of nature’s mystery, hopes for controlling 
one’s destiny, a desire for social cohesion, and the corrupting allure of 
power. Nowhere in that equation is the assumption that life has purpose 
and meaning. Instead, the religion we created demands that life have 
purpose, one that can be found only through faith, as a means of self-
justification, and since we believe in our own creation we do not 
question the conclusion.97 
The analysis reduces the different dimensions of religion to revolve around the 
phenomenon of the fear of death and self-preservation, with the power to manipulate this 
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fear by religious authorities with no good justification.  While his analysis may not be 
completely false, it does obscure the experiential dimension of religion which focuses on 
a particular experience that an individual has self-described as religious in nature.  Also, 
it assumes that secularists have no fear of death whatsoever, which seems doubtful given 
the emphasis to the biological sciences to extend individual human life as long as 
possible.  And is such an emphasis not also a hope of controlling one’s destiny?  And of 
course, the secular state does have many coercive ways of maintaining social cohesion. 
Such an insulting portrayal of religion is a manifestation of religious illiteracy, 
because it suggests that religion and religious people are the only ones acting on faith, 
and only on faith.  The implicit referral to religion as concerned only with “faith,” “the 
metaphysical,” etc. as a manifestation is even more problematic when broadened by the 
inclusion not only of secular polemics against religious worldviews into the analysis, but 
of polemics from religious peoples against other religious worldviews, which trickles into 
one religion telling another religion how to practice religion.  The exclusion of the 
teaching about religion, not only its historical and cultural importance but as its own 
discipline, understanding religion from its own perspective, perpetuates religious 
illiteracy as perceiving religion as “unimportant” or “unconcerned” with the world.  
Moreover the dismissal of religious worldviews backgrounds their influence on modern 
secular discourse, which in this paradigm is seen as solely concerned with the world. 
“Since modern liberal democracies are modeled after the classical ideal of kyriarchal 
democracy, they continue the contradiction between kyriarchal practices and democratic 
self-understandings inscribed in the discourses of democracy in antiquity.”98  The 
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backgrounding of the discourse on religion, and its relegation to the periphery, occludes 
the functioning of the first two structures of Schussler-Fiorenza’s kyriarchy.  The first 
structure states that a kyriarchy is an exploitative hierarchy that “must not be seen as 
static but as an always changing net of relations of domination.” Static approaches to 
religion, such as Riesebrodt’s discussed in the first chapter, blinds the analyst in viewing 
how the periphery is constructed in relation to the center and religion’s place(s) within 
them.  The fluidity of kyriarchy underwrites the second structure which argues that 
“Kyriarchy is realized differently in different historical contexts…it is different in 
Greece, Hellenism, Rome, Asia Minor, Europe, America, Japan, or India; it is different in 
Judaism, Islam, or Catholicism.”99  Religious literacy is crucial for teasing out the 
manifestation of kyriarchies in other societies, which is also essential in unmasking our 
own kyriarchal structures.  Moreover, the method through which we resolve kyriachial 
relations in our culture will not necessarily translate over in others.  Such attempts 
include the drive to “unveil” Muslim women, or the call to completely eradicate female 
circumcision in all its contexts. 
The second manifestation of religious illiteracy according to Moore is when 
religion is used to exclude groups of people from full participation within society by 
“defining the terms of the debates themselves.”100  The lack of tools, or of the 
prerequisite understanding to implement them, is a direct consequence of the exclusion 
and backgrounding by kyriarchal social systems and is further entrenched when the 
discourse on religion is silenced from such places as the public school.  The example she 
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cites regards the efforts of groups such as the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) and the 
Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) to exclude homosexuals from such activities as the 
Saint Patrick’s Day Parade in Boston, and the exclusion of homosexuals as troop leaders 
from the Boys Scouts, describing how all of their actions are coded in religious 
language.101  Moore highlights more troubling actions perpetrated and supported by these 
two organizations, such as protests at rallies which  
highlight the plight of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered (GLBT) 
youth who are often ‘silenced’ due to overt and covert forms of 
discrimination in the schools…One [participant in the protest] was at a 
public high school in a Boston suburb where parents and students 
gathered at the entrance to the school on the day of the protest with 
buttons and banners featuring the silhouette of a man and a woman 
holding and with the caption ‘The Way it is Meant to Be.’102  
These positions however rely upon a particular hermeneutic which Moore argues 
are sectarian.   “First, the arguments in support of these restrictions are theologically 
based upon particular sectarian perspectives…A number of religious groups and 
individuals have articulated religiously inspired moral arguments that are in direct 
contradiction to the positions represented above.”103  The debate in the culture wars 
surrounding GLBT issues blurs the distinction between religion as a private matter, 
accomplished by barring GLBT people from the full privileges of citizenship through 
arbitrary and religiously grounded reasons through very the secular government which 
claims to be completely separated from religion.  This manifestation could also be 
applied to other arbitrary restrictions on lifestyle behaviors that have a fundamental 
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religious assumption as the basis for their rational, such as temperance laws and their 
relation to the work ethic for example, or abortion.  
 Another example of the problematic distinction of religious vs. secular spaces in 
discourse is the recent controversy surrounding the proposed Park 51 Community Center, 
its association as an Islamic center, and the efforts of exclusion by various interest groups 
who cited a perceived loss of dignity to the memory of the victims of 9-11. The discourse 
surrounding “Park 51” belies many “isms” about American Muslim communities that are 
built upon hierarchies of exclusion. Muslim’s in the US have become a particular site of 
fear for those at the center of hegemonic discourse. The popular politico Glenn Beck 
perpetuates this misunderstanding and fear on his website which hosts articles that 
deliberately misrepresent Muslims and Shari’a law as unreasonable. Frank Wuco’s 
characterization of Shari’a law, who is the author of the article on Glenn Beck’s website 
states:  
So, from these two sources, the Qur’an and the Hadith, are drawn the 
instructions and prescriptions for all facets of life, conduct, and law, for 
both individuals and the community as a whole in Islam.  To the 
Muslim, having been drawn from the Qur’an (the direct, undiluted 
“Word of God”) and the Hadith (the customs, habits, and sayings of 
God’s final prophet, Muhammad, the most perfect man ever created), 
shari’ah is the law of God (Allah), delivered to all of humanity 1,400 
years ago!104   
Then Frank Wuco presents Muslims as unreasonable, despite the fact that he 
could be making the same argument that American nationalists do for the United States.  
When his brothers and sisters in jihad kill in defense of Islam and 
shari’ah, their victims have not only gotten what they deserved, by the 
will of God, they will then suffer an eternity of pain unimaginable in 
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hellfire.  To Shazad, his sufferings in the Supermax Federal Prison in 
Colorado will be only temporary and rewarded with an eternity of 
delight and pleasure in heaven.  Such is the belief system that 
proponents of shari’ah desire to see spread the world over, America 
being no exception.105 
The third manifestation of religious illiteracy according to Moore is when 
sectarian perspectives are normalized.  She cites the examples of intelligent design as 
biological science and the efforts of certain groups at reintroducing Biblical studies as 
“Bible as history” within the classroom.  Moore argues to teach these topics as presented 
would be teaching religion as opposed to teaching about religion because a sectarian 
perspective is necessary for them to be taught as such.  Moore is also sensitive to the fact 
that a sectarian perspective is necessary for them to be excluded in the first place.  Moore 
offers a compromise, 
Though teaching creationism and intelligent design in biology classes as 
alternative ‘scientific’ theories to evolution are examples of teaching 
religion…teaching about these perspectives…on understanding the 
culture wars would be very appropriate…Similarly, it would be 
appropriate to teach a course…that focused on the comparative methods 
of Biblical interpretation…In this way, Biblical literalism would be 
presented as one method among many, rather than as the only 
foundation for exploration.106   
The uncritical normalization of sectarian perspectives can only be witnessed to if 
there is a level of religious literacy within society, which is highly likely when a binary is 
created between the religious/private, secular/public.  The smaller the circle of religiously 
literate people, the more difficult it becomes to convince the religiously illiterate of the 
operation of their backgrounded religious assumptions.  The greater the spread of 
religious illiteracy then the intelligibility of the secular as the non-religious becomes 
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more opaque as the secular is presented to another religion.  The normalization of 
sectarian views is the most serious and most difficult manifestation to confront and serves 
as the basis that reinforces the previous two manifestations, when religion is used to 
exclude groups from full participation in society, and when sectarian perspectives are 
normalized within the curriculum.  The normalization of sectarian views is what 
normalizes the exploitive relationships within a kyriarchy.  The process of normalization 
is the seventh structure of Schussler-Fiorenza’s concept of kyriarchy:  
The contradiction between the logic of democracy and historical 
sociopolitical kyriarchal practices has produced the kyriocentric (master-
centered) logic of identity as the assertion of ‘natural differences’ 
between elite men and wo/men, freeborn and slaves, property owners 
and farmers or artisans, Athenian-born citizens and other residents, 
Greeks and barbarians, the civilized and uncivilized world.107   
It is this normalizing process that my critique seeks to rupture, and this critique 
depends upon access to multiple discourses on religion. 
5 REASONS FOR RELIGIOUS STUDIES 
The five purposes for religious studies education noted above in the introduction 
are drawn principally from Diane Moore’s three purposes for education in Overcoming 
Religious Illiteracy. Her work, focusing on teaching about religion in the public schools, 
will be considered here as a point of departure for discussion, and her purposes are: “1) to 
function as active citizens who promote the ideals of democracy; 2) to act as thoughtful 
and informed moral agents; and 3) to lead fulfilling lives.”108 My aim here parallels 
Moore’s but with some differences. Both emphasize that the purpose of education is to 
instill awareness within the student that there is a doing, a practice, necessary to 
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functioning as an active citizen within a democracy, and that this practice is the living out 
of democratic ideals.  The nuanced difference between Moore’s first purpose and my own 
is that I emphasize the importance self-criticism of one’s practice because every practice 
has effects one does not intend.  Also, I explicitly argue that religious studies education 
should concentrate on promoting deliberation and criticism to emphasize that students are 
active in the reproduction of values that are taught and practiced.  Though Moore 
discusses deliberation and criticism in her work as assumptive to democratic values, 
deliberation and criticism are not always necessarily democratic values.  Therefore, this 
study finds that it should not be assumed as a democratic value and is explicitly stated as 
a purpose of education.  Moore does illustrate several other values that a democracy 
should embody and they are worth considering.  Moore quotes Webster’s Dictionary’s 
entry for “democracy” to articulate her own understanding of the essential democratic 
values a public school should foster within students.  They include respect and tolerance: 
1) for minorities, 2) an individual’s freedom of expression, 3) for individuals to develop 
to their fullest human capacities, and 4) of the equal worth and dignity of each 
individual,.109  Each of these four points is wrought with contention, which grounds the 
imperative for them to be discussed within the public school.  Moore comments, “It is 
instructive, for example, to understand how the founding fathers could wholeheartedly 
affirm the values put forth in the Declaration of Independence while at the same time 
justify the ownership of human beings as slaves.  In a more contemporary example, how 
‘democratic values’ are defined is hotly contested in the current culture wars.”110   Both 
of Moore’s examples can only be critically engaged and understood with a sufficient 
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religious literacy to give a comprehensive understanding of their underlying processes.  
The first example, slavery provides an example on how hermeneutical conflicts were 
used to justify both the institution of slavery and its abolition.  This serves to explain how 
the Founding Fathers could affirm both the humanistic language of the Declaration of 
Independence, while at the same time affirm to slavery’s implementation in the 
Constitution. This is an important phenomenon of the American past, and to background 
religion’s involvement in the debate surrounding slavery in the United States serves to 
occlude Moore’s second point about how “democratic values” are constructed.  This is a 
powerful reason for the inclusion of the study of religion as its own subject. 
Moore’s second purpose of education, “to act as thoughtful moral agents,” also 
influences my second purpose stated in the introduction.  Moore’s second purpose of 
education logically follows and reinforces her first purpose of education, which is for 
students to become functional in promoting the ideals of democracy.  It is through the 
agency embedded within students and the educational system that social values are 
reproduced and continue to exist.  Education then should make students aware of the 
relationship between the consequences of practice against the rest of the environment, 
democracy being the political environment of the United States. Agency and practice, 
including the agency of the school and of the students, is what reproduces society.  That 
is, for democracies to reflect the values articulated in the above paragraph, it is only by 
‘being’ democratic and acting upon democratic principles that democracy can continue.  
Moore reiterates this rationale for her second purpose arguing that “Schools should 
inspire and empower students to take themselves seriously as moral agents capable of 
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making a positive difference in the world.”111  This chapter broadens Moore’s second 
purpose by emphasizing not only the student’s role as an agent, but in education’s 
purpose to cultivate a sense of moral agency within the student, the “why” to or not to 
act. I argue that the school is an agent in itself, albeit a social agent rather than an 
individual.  Education can thereby criticize the prevailing assumption of agency as an 
individual and active phenomenon.  Plumwood has characterized the extreme example of 
the effect when the assumed concept of individual agency is left unchecked and 
perceived as the only form of agency possible.  Individual agency cannot remain as a 
static uncharacterized concept, it needs to be attached to an object to make sense, this 
object has traditionally been the male landowner who “picked himself up by his 
bootstraps,” through the use of reason. “The self-made man is for the most part a hyper-
separated autonomous self whose illusion of self-containment is built on denying or 
backgrounding the contributions of subordinated others and re-presenting the joint 
product in terms of a hyperbolised individualistic agency who is to be treated as the only 
or primary ‘achiever.’”112 Students are rarely instructed on other forms of agency, such as 
individual and passive, social and active, or social and passive.  Likewise, they are not 
given the tools to criticize the patriarchal background on which our conceptualization of 
agency is grounded.  Plumwood further articulates how the backgrounding of the 
complexity of agency leads to the assumption of humans being somehow separated from 
the natural environment, which is seen as inert or “mechanical.”  Exclusion serves as the 
true base for kyriarchal exploitation as the first backgrounded other, upon which all of the 
other kyriarchal qualifications are based to support the kyriarchal pyramid.  The 
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separating of human beings from the natural environment leads to binary construction. 
“Such systems conspire to conceal from us our dependency on nature, to overestimate our 
autonomy and manipulative ability…According to its story, nature has no agency or 
autonomy of its own and imposes no real limits on us.”113  The discourse on individual 
agency and the discourse to background other forms of agency have their roots within 
religious discourses from our European-Christian past and its criticism is contingent upon 
fostering a critical discourse around religion. 
 For education to fulfill the previous two of Moore’s purposes however, Moore 
recognizes that the public school system would need to fulfill the mission of making 
every discourse available to the student as ascribed to it by Foucault. To enable this 
means allowing religious discourse to enter into the public school system.  Allowing 
access to as many discourses as possible is what allows the public school to act as a space 
for social critique and evaluation of discourses, in order to bring to light and question 
such assumptions as the clear differentiation between religion and the secular.  This 
understanding of the public school builds on the notion of the space of education as a 
critical space, emphasizes its location in community. The third purpose of education I 
articulated above attempts to build this understanding into the space of public schools.  
Uncritical social assumptions, such the doctrine of a clear differentiation between religion 
and the secular, should be publically challenged since they are based on a particular 
discourse and history.  These formations concerning the roles between the school, 
society, and religion, have been described by Schussler-Fiorenza as a hermeneutical 
“dance,” each dependent on the other and on a shared Christian heritage.  Schussler-
                                                            
113 Ibid, pg. 35 
78 
 
Fiorenza elaborates on the relationship between the various ‘dance’ partners. She writes, 
“Thus the dance of interpretation always has as its goal a hermeneutics of change and 
transformation.  When seeking future visions and transformations, we can only 
extrapolate from present-day experience, which is always determined by past 
experience.”114  Since education seeks to critique and transform society, education should 
look towards other religion to seek examples that break the hold particular Christian 
interpretations have on concepts such as agency.  Schussler-Fiorenza argues: 
 The spiraling dance of interpretation seeks to engender public 
the*logical deliberation and religious transformation.  It is not restricted 
to Christian canonical texts, but it can be and has been explored 
successfully by scholars of other religious traditions.115   
The previous articulation third purpose of education may seem redundant since 
the first purpose explicitly states criticism as a democratic value and Moore articulates 
critical thinking skills as integral to moral agency and the reproduction of social values. 
“Students should be encouraged to foster this optimism and the critical thinking skills 
necessary to recognize and interrogate contemporary social values and assumptions to 
ensure that the values promoted are consistent with those they consciously wish to 
promote.”116  However, there has been a running assumption throughout this thesis that 
education takes place in a school.  Thus, my third purpose verbalizes the school as the 
site of education and nuances it by highlighting the actual place of the school as a site of 
critique.  Also, by correlating social critique with education I reinforce their relationship 
so that social critique is education and to educate means to be critical.  Finally, by 
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establishing the place of the school within the community, I argue for the 
contextualization of the relationship between the curriculum and social critique in general 
to the needs of the local community and the society at large.  Finally, I reinforce with this 
third purpose, what Schussler-Fiorenza means by “ethos.”  Drawing on the work done by 
Susan Jarratt and Nedra Reynolds, Schussler-Fiorenza ties the etymology of the word 
“ethos” to both ethos and ethea. She writes, ethos is not only tied to “the Greek ethos- 
meaning custom, habit, usage, folkways- or from the Greek ēthos- meaning character 
formation as the totality of all characteristic traits rather than mere custom or morally 
approved habits.”117  But it is also tied to the Greek term ēthea, which is, “a plural noun 
that is the original root of both terms and means ‘hunts’ or ‘hangouts.’  This etymology 
understands ethos as a pedagogical space where customs and character are formed.”118  
The understanding of pedagogy as a “hunt” retains the notion that education is found on 
the margins and is a form of labor, as well as being congruent with our dual notions of 
place in respect to the archive.  The “hunts” inevitably took place, remember the “taking 
place of an archive,” within a wilderness as the “having a place,” where this ethics were 
formulated, and has the sequential implication of providing nourishment for the exercise. 
The “hangouts,” a “having a place” of the archive, emphasizes the place of the public 
school as a social space for construction students with the practical skills to obtain 
employment.  “Ethos as a disciplinary space determines the professional character of 
individuals…In this spatial sense, ethos theorizes the ‘positionality’ inherent in 
rhetoric.”119  The objective of this chapter’s third purpose of education is to verbalize the 
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relationship between the environment, the school, education, and the student as a critical 
relationship. 
 The overcoming of religious illiteracy has an economic component to it which is 
articulated in my fourth purpose of education mentioned in the introduction, viz. that 
education should prepare students for a functional role in the economy.   There are two 
dimensions to religious literacy which affect the economy. First, the present service 
economy requires sensitivity to differing worldviews.  The second but co-dependent 
dimension to religious literacy is the element of social cohesion necessary for a stable 
economy in general.  Education itself has a greater role than simply literacy.  John Dewey 
in Democracy and Education has argued that education has a vocational aspect. He 
writes, “Nothing is more tragic than failure to discover one’s true business in life, or to 
find that one has drifted or been forced by circumstance into an uncongenial 
calling…Plato laid down the fundamental principle of a philosophy of education when he 
asserted that it was the business of education to discover what each person is good 
for.”120  Circumstances of course dictate the type of jobs which citizens will be able to 
hold and the United States in the last twenty years has steadily become a service 
economy rather than a manufacturing or agricultural economy.  As a service economy, 
interpersonal skills are extremely important and religious literacy is an important 
interpersonal skill to have. However, education should also be critical of economic 
theories and practices which exacerbate the myth of human separation from the natural 
environment.  A society highly reliant on a service economy is prone to reinforce this 
myth as if we don’t daily depend upon the rest of the natural world. “This is exemplified 
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in the recent hype about the ‘weightless’ economy, which comes very close to denying 
the necessity of the material world.”121Finally, religious literacy would contribute to 
vocation discernment that Dewey calls for.  An occupation is fundamental to living a 
fulfilling life, which is the last of the purposes of education this paper is considering.   
Ultimately, the previous four purposes lead to the cultivation of a purposeful, 
fulfilling, and contributive life, and for this reason, Moore argues, the school curriculum 
should be as broad as possible. “Literacy of all kinds (numeric, artistic, scientific, 
religious, linguistic, cultural) should be consistently promoted and evaluated in ways that 
are meaningful and relevant.”122  Religious literacy is the focus of this study and it is seen 
as crucial for this last purpose because religious literacy allows students to critique and 
transform society.  For many who are living on the bottom of the kyriarchal pyramid, 
leading a fulfilling life means transgressing those very assumptions which have 
maintained such structures of domination. bell hooks comments on how a transgressive 
pedagogy creates a sense of excitement in students by reflecting on her first experience in 
a desegregated school.  
When we entered racist, desegregated, white schools we left a world 
where teachers believed that to educate black children rightly would 
require a political commitment.  Now, we were mainly taught by white 
teachers whose lessons reinforced racist stereotypes.  For black children, 
education was no longer about the practice of freedom.  Realizing this, I 
lost my love of school.123           
One important assumption which could easily be problematized with the inclusion 
of the study about religion with the public school is that of anthropocentrism. The next 
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section will provide a detailed discussion on anthropocentrism, why it is a cultural 
construct, and why it is important to criticize it. 
CONCLUSION 
 
The thesis has taken a deconstructive, discursive view of the different elements 
necessary for maintaining a “divide” between the “secular” and the “religious.”  Such a 
divide, I have argued, is itself encapsulated in a particular religion’s history. I introduced 
Derrida’s concept of the archive and messianism to elaborate on how these binary 
divisions are formed, understood, and reproduced, and pointed to their intended and 
unintended consequences.  The promulgation of such a divide engenders a potential to 
violence because of the unbounded varieties of what religion can represent. The 
reproduction of this divide is archived, both socially and individually, with all of the 
violent and non-violent episodes and experiences providing its content. Without 
accessing these various archives, they cannot be critiqued, and their operative agency 
within the framework of society goes unchecked and left free to run abound.  These 
effects were analyzed using Derrida’s concepts of messianism, chora, and archive, which 
highlighted how important it is to care for the archive through criticism, to rupture 
misrepresentations and to highlight the co-dependence of concepts.  A critical space is 
necessary to rupture problematic binaries and provide citizens with the tool of religious 
literacy.  About space, the teaching about religion in public schools also provides a place 
within the secular landscape for religions to voice themselves, and for secular spaces to 
coherently define themselves as the other space.  The facilitation of a multivocal 
discourse is the primary reason for including the teaching about religion in public 
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schools, since such spaces are discursively formed and therefore discourse between both 
spaces is necessary for them to be intelligible.  
The increased sensitivity to religion has ramifications, not only for our own 
society, but also for the other cultures we necessarily deal with.  By viewing just how the 
local environment warps and changes what it means to have a religious space or a secular 
space, it hopefully emphasizes a concern for the care and value of differing religious 
environments and traditions.  Moreover, awareness of the religious environment brings to 
light our own religious assumptions so we can qualify and critique them.  Sensitivity to 
the religious environment gives students a deeper understanding of other societies from 
within their own perspectives, as well as a clearer understanding of the ramifications of 
our own actions upon them, most powerfully seen through the present process of 
globalization and the violent responses by some of its discontents.  The level of 
sensitivity to a religious environment is contingent upon the level of religious literacy in 
society.  The relationship between the two generates the second reason for incorporating 
the study about religion, which is to develop the tool of religious literacy in the first 
place.  Religious literacy is the bridge between the first reason, to maintain an open 
discourse, and the third reason, that uncriticized assumptions are locally and 
environmentally constructed, and when transported to another environment, i.e. culture, 
they engender violence when applied without sophistication or caring.  If the 
consequences of religious illiteracy were benign, then the problem would not be so 
serious; however, the continued pervasiveness of religious cultures of violence , demands 
that they be addressed.  
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